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Abstract
This paper continues the research on the computational aspects of Halpern and Pearl’s causes and explanations in the structural-
model approach. To this end, we first explore how an instance of deciding weak cause can be reduced to an equivalent instance
in which irrelevant variables in the (potential) weak cause and the causal model are removed, which extends previous work by
Hopkins. We then present a new characterization of weak cause for a certain class of causal models in which the causal graph over
the endogenous variables has the form of a directed chain of causal subgraphs, called decomposable causal graph. Furthermore,
we also identify two important subclasses in which the causal graph over the endogenous variables forms a directed tree and
more generally a directed chain of layers, called causal tree and layered causal graph, respectively. By combining the removal of
irrelevant variables with this new characterization of weak cause, we then obtain techniques for deciding and computing causes
and explanations in the structural-model approach, which can be done in polynomial time under suitable restrictions. This way,
we obtain several tractability results for causes and explanations in the structural-model approach. To our knowledge, these are
the first explicit ones. They are especially useful for dealing with structure-based causes and explanations in first-order reasoning
about actions, which produces large causal models that are naturally layered through the time line, and thus have the structure of
layered causal graphs. Furthermore, an important feature of the tractable cases for causal trees and layered causal graphs is that
they can be recognized efficiently, namely in linear time. Finally, by extending the new characterization of weak cause, we obtain
similar techniques for computing the degrees of responsibility and blame, and hence also novel tractability results for structure-
based responsibility and blame.
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Dealing with causality is an important issue which emerges in many applications of AI. The existing approaches to
causality in AI can be roughly divided into those that have been developed as modal nonmonotonic logics (especially
in logic programming) and those that evolved from the area of Bayesian networks. A representative of the former
is Geffner’s modal nonmonotonic logic for handling causal knowledge [12,13], which is inspired by default reason-
ing from conditional knowledge bases. Other modal-logic based formalisms play an important role in dealing with
causal knowledge about actions and change; see especially the work by Turner [36] and the references therein for an
overview. A representative of the latter is Pearl’s approach to modeling causality by structural equations [1,10,30,31],
which is central to a number of recent research efforts. In particular, the evaluation of deterministic and probabilistic
counterfactuals has been explored, which is at the core of problems in fault diagnosis, planning, decision making, and
determination of liability [1]. It has been shown that the structural-model approach allows a precise modeling of many
important causal relationships, which can especially be used in natural language processing [10]. An axiomatization
of reasoning about causal formulas in the structural-model approach has been given by Halpern [14].
Causality also plays an important role in the generation of explanations, which are of crucial importance in areas
like planning, diagnosis, natural language processing, and probabilistic inference. Different notions of explanations
have been studied quite extensively, see especially [11,19,34] for philosophical work, and [20,29,35] for work in
AI related to Bayesian networks. A critical examination of such approaches from the viewpoint of explanations in
probabilistic systems is given in [2].
In [15], Halpern and Pearl formalized causality using a model-based definition, which allows for a precise modeling
of many important causal relationships. Based on a notion of weak causality, they offer appealing definitions of actual
causality [16] and causal explanations [18]. As they show, their notions of actual cause and causal explanation, which
is very different from the concept of causal explanation in [12,26,27], models well many problematic examples in the
literature.
The following example from [3] illustrates the structural-model approach. Roughly, structural causal models consist
of a set of random variables, which may have a causal influence on each other. The variables are divided into exogenous
variables, which are influenced by factors outside the model, and endogenous variables, which are influenced by
exogenous and endogenous variables. This latter influence is described by structural equations for the endogenous
variables. For more details on structural causal models, we refer to Section 2 and especially to [1,10,14,30,31].
Example 1.1 (rock throwing). Suppose that Suzy and Billy pick up rocks and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets
there first, shattering the bottle. Since both throws are fully accurate, Billy’s rock would have shattered the bottle, if
Suzy had not thrown. We may model such a scenario in the structural-model approach as follows. We assume two
binary background variables US and UB , which determine the motivation and the state of mind of Suzy and Billy,
where US (resp., UB ) is 1 iff Suzy (resp., Billy) intends to throw a rock. We then have five binary variables ST , BT ,
SH, BH, and BS, which describe the observable situation, where ST (resp., BT) is 1 iff Suzy (resp., Billy) throws a
rock, SH (resp., BH) is 1 iff Suzy’s (resp., Billy’s) rock hits the bottle, and BS is 1 iff the bottle shatters. The causal
dependencies between these variables are expressed by functions, which say that (i) the value of ST (resp., BT) is
given by the value of US (resp., UB ), (ii) SH is 1 iff ST is 1, (iii) BH is 1 iff BT is 1 and SH is 0, and (iv) BS is 1 iff
SH or BH is 1. These dependencies can be graphically represented as in Fig. 1.
Some actual causes and explanations in the structural-model approach are then informally given as follows. If both
Suzy and Billy intend to throw a rock, then (i) Suzy’s throwing a rock is an actual cause of the bottle shattering,
while (ii) Billy’s throwing a rock is not. Furthermore, (iii) if either Suzy or Billy intends to throw a rock, then Suzy’s
throwing a rock is an explanation of the bottle shattering. Here, (i)–(iii) are roughly determined as follows. As for (i),
if both Suzy and Billy intend to throw a rock, then Suzy actually throws a rock, and the bottle actually shatters.
Fig. 1. Causal graph.
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the bottle does not shatter, and (b) if Suzy throws a rock, then the bottle shatters, even if any of the other variables
would take their actual values. As for (ii), there is no structural contingency under which (a) if Billy does not throw
a rock, then the bottle does not shatter, and (b) if Billy throws a rock, then the bottle shatters, even if any of the other
variables would take their actual values. Finally, as for (iii), if either Suzy or Billy intends to throw a rock, then the
bottle actually shatters, Suzy’s throwing a rock is a cause of the bottle shattering whenever she actually throws a rock,
and there are some possible contexts in which Suzy throws a rock and some in which she does not. Intuitively, there
should be a possible context in which the explanation is false, so that it is not already known, and a possible context
in which the explanation is true, so that it is not vacuous.
There are a number of recent papers that are based on Halpern and Pearl’s definitions of actual causality [16] and
causal explanations [18]. In particular, Chockler and Halpern [3] define the notions of responsibility and blame as a
refinement of actual causality. Chockler, Halpern, and Kupferman [4] then make use of the notion of responsibility for
verifying a system against a formal specification. Along another line of application, Hopkins and Pearl [23] and Finzi
and Lukasiewicz [9] generalize structure-based causes and explanations to a first-order framework and make them
available in situation-calculus-based reasoning about actions (see Section 3). Furthermore, Hopkins and Pearl [24]
explore the usage of structure-based causality [16] for commonsense causal reasoning. Finally, inspired by Halpern
and Pearl’s notions of actual causality [16] and causal explanations [18], Park [28] presents a novel approach allowing
for different causal criteria that are influenced by psychological factors not representable in a structural causal model.
The semantic aspects of causes and explanations in the structural-model approach have been thoroughly studied in
[15–18]. Their computational complexity has been analyzed in [6,7], where it has been shown that associated decision
problems are intractable in general. For example, deciding actual causes (as defined in [16]) is complete for the class
P2 (= NPNP) of the Polynomial Hierarchy, while deciding whether an explanation over certain variables exists is
complete for P3 (= NP
P
2 ). Thus, these problems are “harder” than the classical propositional satisfiability problem
(which is NP-complete), but “easier” than PSPACE-complete problems. Chockler and Halpern [3] and Chockler,
Halpern, and Kupferman [4] have shown that computing the degrees of responsibility and blame is complete for
polynomial time computation with restricted use of a P2 oracle (see Section 4.4). As for algorithms, Hopkins [21]
explored search-based strategies for computing actual causes in both the general and restricted settings.
However, to our knowledge, no tractable cases for causes and explanations in the structural-model approach were
explicitly known so far. In this paper, we aim at filling this gap and provide non-trivial tractability results for the main
computational problems on causes and explanations. These tractability results are especially useful for dealing with
structure-based causes and explanations in first-order reasoning about actions as recently introduced in [9], where one
has to handle binary causal models with a quite large number of variables (see Section 3). We make contributions to
several issues, which are briefly summarized as follows:
• The first issue concerns focusing of the computation to the relevant part of the causal model. Extending work by
Hopkins [21], we explore how an instance of deciding weak cause can be reduced to an equivalent instance in
which the (potential) weak cause and the causal model may contain fewer variables. That is, irrelevant variables
in weak causes and causal models are identified and removed. We provide two such reductions in this paper,
which have different properties, but can be both carried out in polynomial time. These reductions can lead to great
simplifications in (potential) weak causes and causal models, and thus speed up considerably computations about
causes and explanations. Notice that weak causes are fundamental to the notion of actual cause, to various forms
of explanations, as well as to the notions of responsibility and blame.
• The second issue to which we contribute are characterizations of weak causes in the structural-model approach.
We present a novel such characterization for a class of causal models in which the causal graph over the endoge-
nous variables has the form of a directed chain of causal subgraphs, which we call a decomposable causal graph.
We also identify two natural subclasses of decomposable causal graphs, where the causal graph over the endoge-
nous variables forms a directed tree and, more generally, a directed chain of layers, which we call a causal tree
and a layered causal graph, respectively, and provide simplified versions of the characterizations of weak causes.
• By combining the removal of irrelevant variables (in weak causes and causal models) with this new characteriza-
tion of weak cause in the above causal models, we obtain algorithms for deciding and computing weak causes,
actual causes, explanations, partial explanations, and α-partial explanations, as well as for computing the ex-
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obtain several tractability results for the structural-model approach. To our knowledge, these are the first ones that
are explicitly derived for structure-based causes and explanations.
• Furthermore, by slightly extending the new characterization of weak cause in the above causal models, we also
obtain algorithms for computing the degrees of responsibility and blame in the structural-model approach, which
similarly run in polynomial time under suitable conditions. We thus also obtain new tractability results for the
structure-based notions of responsibility and blame. Note that Chockler, Halpern, and Kupferman [4] have re-
cently shown that computing the degree of responsibility in read-once Boolean formulas (which are Boolean
formulas in which each variable occurs at most once) is possible in linear time.
• The tractability results for layered causal graphs are especially useful for dealing with structure-based causes and
explanations in first-order reasoning about actions [9], which produces large binary causal models that have a
natural layering through the time line and thus the structure of layered causal graphs (see Section 3). Finally, we
also show that all the above techniques and results carry over to a generalization of causal models to extended
causal models, which has been recently introduced by Halpern and Pearl in [17].
An attractive feature of the tractable cases identified for causal trees and layered causal graphs is that the respective
problem instances can be recognized efficiently, namely in linear time. For general decomposable causal graphs,
however, this is not the case, since this problem is NP-complete in general. Nonetheless, effort spent for the recognition
may be more than compensated by the speed up in solving the reasoning problems on weak causes and explanations.
Our results on the computational and semantic properties of weak causes and explanations help, as we believe, to
enlarge the understanding of and insight into the structural-model approach by Halpern and Pearl and its properties.
Furthermore, they provide the basis for developing efficient algorithms and pave the way for implementations. For
example, complexity results on answer set programming [5] have guided the development of efficient solvers such as
DLV [25]. The results of this paper are in particular of interest and significant, since a structural decomposition seems
natural and applies to a number of examples from the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries on structural causal models
as well as on causes, explanations, responsibility, and blame in structural causal models. Section 3 describes how
structure-based causal concepts can be defined in first-order reasoning about actions. In Section 4, we describe the
decision and optimization problems for which we present tractability results in this paper, and we summarize previous
complexity results for these problems. In Section 5, we explore the removal of irrelevant variables when deciding
weak cause. Section 6 presents tractability results for causal trees. Section 7 then generalizes to decomposable causal
graphs, while Section 8 concentrates on layered causal graphs. In Section 9, we generalize the above techniques and
results to extended causal models. Section 10 summarizes our results and gives a conclusion. To increase readability,
all proofs have been moved to Appendices A–E.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give some technical preliminaries. We recall Pearl’s structural causal models and Halpern and
Pearl’s notions of weak and actual cause [15–17] and their notions of explanation, partial explanation, and explanatory
power [15,18].
2.1. Causal models
We start with recalling structural causal models; for further background and motivation, see especially [1,10,14,30,
31]. Roughly, the main idea behind structural causal models is that the world is modeled by random variables, which
may have a causal influence on each other. The variables are divided into exogenous variables, which are influenced by
factors outside the model, and endogenous variables, which are influenced by exogenous and endogenous variables.
This latter influence is described by structural equations for the endogenous variables.
More formally, we assume a finite set of random variables. Capital letters U,V,W, etc. denote variables and
sets of variables. Each variable Xi may take on values from a finite domain D(Xi). A value for a set of variables
X = {X1, . . . ,Xn} is a mapping x :X → D(X1) ∪ · · · ∪ D(Xn) such that x(Xi) ∈ D(Xi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; for
X = ∅, the unique value is the empty mapping ∅. The domain of X, denoted D(X), is the set of all values for X.
546 T. Eiter, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 170 (2006) 542–580We say that X is domain-bounded iff |D(Xi)|  k for every Xi ∈ X, where k is some global constant. Lower case
letters x, y, z, etc. denote values for the variables or the sets of variables X,Y,Z, etc., respectively. Assignments
X = x of values to variables are often abbreviated by the value x. We often identify singletons {Xi} with Xi , and their
values x with x(Xi).
For Y ⊆X and x ∈D(X), we denote by x|Y the restriction of x to Y . For disjoint sets of variables X,Y and values
x ∈ D(X), y ∈ D(Y), we denote by xy the union of x and y. For (not necessarily disjoint) sets of variables X,Y and
values x ∈D(X), y ∈D(Y), we denote by [x〈y] the union of x|(X \ Y) and y.
A causal model M = (U,V,F ) consists of two disjoint finite sets U and V of exogenous and endogenous variables,
respectively, and a set F = {FX | X ∈ V } of functions that assign a value of X to each value of the parents PAX ⊆
U ∪ V \ {X} of X. Every value u ∈ D(U) is also called a context. We call a causal model M = (U,V,F ) domain-
bounded iff every X ∈ V is domain-bounded. In particular, M is binary iff |D(X)| = 2 for all X ∈ V . The parent
relationship between the variables of M = (U,V,F ) is expressed by the causal graph for M , denoted G(M), which
is the directed graph (N,E) that has U ∪ V as the set of nodes N , and a directed edge from X to Y in E iff X is a
parent of Y , for all variables X,Y ∈U ∪ V . We use GV (M) to denote the subgraph of G(M) induced by V .
We focus here on the principal class of recursive causal models M = (U,V,F ); as argued in [15], we do not lose
much generality by concentrating on recursive causal models. A causal model M = (U,V,F ) is recursive, if its causal
graph is a directed acyclic graph. Equivalently, there exists a total ordering ≺ on V such that Y ∈ PAX implies Y ≺X,
for all X,Y ∈ V . In recursive causal models, every assignment U = u to the exogenous variables determines a unique
value y for every set of endogenous variables Y ⊆ V , denoted by YM(u) (or simply by Y(u), if M is understood). In
the following, M is reserved for denoting a recursive causal model.
Example 2.1 (rock throwing cont’d). The causal model M = (U,V,F ) for Example 1.1 is given by U = {US,UB},
V = {ST,BT,SH,BH,BS}, and F = {FST , FBT , FSH , FBH , FBS}, where FST = US , FBT = UB , FSH = ST , FBH = 1
iff BT = 1 and SH = 0, and FBS = 1 iff SH = 1 or BH = 1. Fig. 1 shows the causal graph for M , that is, the parent
relationships between the exogenous and endogenous variables in M . Since this graph is acyclic, M is recursive.
In a causal model, we may set endogenous variables X to a value x by an “external action”. More formally, for any
causal model M = (U,V,F ), set of endogenous variables X ⊆ V , and value x ∈ D(X), the causal model MX=x is
given by (U,V \X,FX=x), where FX=x = {F ′Y | Y ∈ V \X} and each F ′Y is obtained from FY by setting X to x, is a
submodel of M . We use Mx and Fx to abbreviate MX=x and FX=x , respectively, if X is understood from the context.
Similarly, for a set of endogenous variables Y ⊆ V and u ∈ D(U), we write Yx(u) to abbreviate YMx (u). We assume
that X(u)= x for all u ∈D(U) in the submodel of M where X is set to x.
As for computation, we assume for causal models M = (U,V,F ) no particular form of representation of the func-
tions FX :D(PAX) → D(X), X ∈ V , in F (by formulas, circuits, etc.), but that every FX is evaluable in polynomial
time. Furthermore, we assume that the causal graph G(M) for M is part of the input representation of M . Notice that
G(M) is computable from M with any common representation of the functions FX (by formulas, circuits, etc.) in
time linear in the size of the representation of M anyway. For any causal model M , we denote by ‖M‖ the size of its
representation.
The following proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 2.1. For all X,Y ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), the values Y(u) and Yx(u), given u ∈ D(U), are computable in
polynomial time.
2.2. Weak and actual causes
We now recall weak and actual causes from [15–17]. We first define events and the truth of events in a causal model
M = (U,V,F ) under a context u ∈D(U).
A primitive event is an expression of the form Y = y, where Y is an endogenous variable and y is a value for Y .
The set of events is the closure of the set of primitive events under the Boolean operations ¬ and ∧ (that is, every
primitive event is an event, and if φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ and φ ∧ψ ). For any event φ, we denote by V (φ)
the set of all variables in φ.
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inductively defined as follows:
• (M,u) |= Y = y iff YM(u)= y;
• (M,u) |= ¬φ iff (M,u) |= φ does not hold;
• (M,u) |= φ ∧ψ iff (M,u) |= φ and (M,u) |=ψ .
Further operators ∨ and → are defined as usual, that is, φ ∨ ψ and φ → ψ stand for ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) and ¬φ ∨ ψ ,
respectively. We write φM(u) (resp., φ(u) if M is understood) to abbreviate (M,u) |= φ. For X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), we
use φMx (u) (resp., φx(u)) as an abbreviation of (Mx,u) |= φ. For X = {X1, . . . ,Xk} ⊆ V with k  1 and xi ∈D(Xi),
1 i  k, we use X = x1 · · ·xk to abbreviate the event X1 = x1 ∧ · · · ∧Xk = xk . For any event φ, we denote by ‖φ‖
its size, which is the number of symbols in it.
The following result follows immediately from Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.2. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X). Given u ∈ D(U) and an event φ, deciding whether φ(u) holds (resp.,
φx(u) holds for given x) is feasible in polynomial time.
We are now ready to recall the notions of weak and actual cause as recently introduced by Halpern and Pearl
in [17]. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), and let φ be an event. Then, X = x is a
weak cause of φ under u ∈D(U) iff the following conditions hold:
AC1. X(u)= x and φ(u).
AC2. Some W ⊆ V \X and some x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φxw(u), and
(b) φxw′ zˆ(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W), w′ =w|W ′, and zˆ = Zˆ(u).
Loosely speaking, AC1 says that both X = x and φ hold under u, while AC2 expresses that X = x is a nontrivial
reason for φ. Here, the dependence of φ from X = x is tested under special structural contingencies, where some
W ⊆ V \ X is kept at some value w ∈ D(W). AC2(a) says that φ can be false for other values of X under w, while
AC2(b) essentially ensures that X alone is sufficient for the change from φ to ¬φ. Observe that X = x can be a weak
cause only if X is nonempty.
Furthermore, X = x is an actual cause of φ under u iff additionally the following minimality condition is satisfied:
AC3. X is minimal. That is, no proper subset of X satisfies both AC1 and AC2.
The following result says that for singletons X, it holds that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff X = x is an actual
cause of φ under u. This result is immediate by the observation that X is nonempty for every weak cause X = x of φ
under u.
Theorem 2.3. Let M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U). Let φ be an event. If X is a singleton, then
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff X = x is an actual cause of φ under u.
We give an example to illustrate the above notions of weak and actual cause.
Example 2.2 (rock throwing cont’d). Consider the context u1,1 = (1,1) in which both Suzy and Billy intend to throw
a rock. Then, both ST = 1 and ST = 1 ∧ BT = 1 are weak causes of BS = 1, while BT = 1 is not. For instance, let us
show that ST = 1 is a weak cause of BS = 1 under u1,1. As for AC1, both ST and BS are 1 under u1,1. As for AC2,
under the contingency that BT is set to 0, we have that (a) if ST is set to 0, then BS has the value 0, and (b) if ST is set
to 1, then BS is 1. In fact, ST = 1 is an actual cause of BS = 1 under u1,1 (by Theorem 2.3), while ST = 1 ∧ BT = 1
is not. Furthermore, ST = 1 (resp., BT = 1) is a weak (and by Theorem 2.3 also an actual) cause of BS = 1 under
u1,0 = (1,0) (resp., u0,1 = (0,1)) in which only Suzy (resp., Billy) intends to throw a rock.
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uses the following AC2′ instead of AC2:
AC2′. Some W ⊆ V \X and some x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φxw(u), and
(b) φxwzˆ(u) for all Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W) and zˆ = Zˆ(u).
Here, only φxwzˆ(u) holds in (b), but not necessarily φxw′ zˆ(u) for all W ′ ⊆ W and w′ = w|W . However, as pointed
out by Hopkins and Pearl [24], this earlier weak cause is too permissive, which is shown by the following example
from [24].
Example 2.3. Suppose that a prisoner dies either if a loads b’s gun and b shoots, or if c loads and shoots his gun. We
assume the binary endogenous variables A, B , C, and D, where (i) A = 1 iff a loads b’s gun, (ii) B = 1 iff b shoots,
(iii) C = 1 iff c loads and shoots his gun, and (iv) D = 1 iff the prisoner dies, that is, iff (A = 1 ∧B = 1)∨ (C = 1).
Consider the context u in which a loads b’s gun, b does not shoot, and c loads and shoots his gun, and thus the prisoner
dies. Then, C = 1 should be a weak cause of D = 1, which is in fact the case under both definitions. Furthermore,
A = 1 should not be a weak cause of D = 1. However, this is only the case for the notion of weak cause from [17],
but not for the one from [15,16].
We note that all results of this paper also carry over to the earlier weak cause [8].
2.3. Explanations
We next recall the concept of an explanation from [15,18]. Intuitively, an explanation of an observed event φ is
a minimal conjunction of primitive events that causes φ even when there is uncertainty about the actual situation at
hand. The agent’s epistemic state is given by a set of possible contexts u ∈ D(U), which describes all the possible
scenarios for the actual situation.
Formally, let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), let φ be an event, and let C ⊆D(U) be
a set of contexts. Then, X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C iff the following conditions hold:
EX1. φ(u) holds, for every context u ∈ C.
EX2. X = x is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C such that X(u)= x.
EX3. X is minimal. That is, for every X′⊂X, some context u ∈ C exists such that X′(u)= x|X′ and X′ = x|X′ is not
a weak cause of φ under u.
EX4. X(u)= x and X(u′) = x for some u,u′ ∈ C.
Note that in EX3, any counterexample X′ ⊂ X to minimality must be a nonempty set of variables. The following
example illustrates the above notion of explanation.
Example 2.4 (rock throwing cont’d). Consider the set of contexts C = {u1,1, u1,0, u0,1}. Then, ST = 1 is an explanation
of BS = 1 relative to C, since EX1 BS(u1,1) = BS(u1,0) = BS(u0,1) = 1, EX2 ST = 1 is a weak cause of BS = 1
under both u1,1 and u1,0, EX3 ST is obviously minimal, and EX4 ST(u1,1) = 1 and ST(u0,1) = 1. Furthermore,
ST = 1 ∧ BT = 1 is not an explanation of BS = 1 relative to C, since here the minimality condition EX3 is violated.
2.4. Partial explanations and explanatory power
We next recall the notions of α-partial/partial explanations and of explanatory power of partial explanations [15,
18]. Roughly, the main idea behind partial explanations is to generalize the notion of explanation of Section 2.3 to a
setting where additionally a probability distribution over the set of possible contexts is given.
Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X). Let φ be an event, and let C ⊆D(U) be such that
φ(u) for all u ∈ C. We use Cφ to denote the largest subset C′ of C such that X = x is an explanation of φ relativeX=x
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of C exists such that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C′; it also characterizes CφX=x .
Proposition 2.4. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X). Let φ be an event, and let
C ⊆ D(U) be such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C. If X = x is an explanation of φ relative to some C′ ⊆ C, then CφX=x is the
set of all u ∈ C such that either (i) X(u) = x, or (ii) X(u)= x and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u.
Let P be a probability function on C (that is, P is a mapping from C to the interval [0,1] such that∑u∈C P(u)= 1),
and define
P
(CφX=x |X = x)=
∑
u∈CφX=x ,
X(u)=x
P (u)
/ ∑
u∈C,
X(u)=x
P (u).
Then, X = x is called an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff CφX=x is defined and P(CφX=x | X = x) α.
We say X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) iff X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to
(C,P ) for some α > 0; furthermore, P(CφX=x |X = x) is called its explanatory power (or goodness).
Example 2.5 (rock throwing cont’d). Consider the set of contexts C = {u1,1, u1,0, u0,1}, and let P(u1,1) = 0.2 and
P(u1,0) = P(u0,1) = 0.4. Then, CBS=1ST=1 = C, and thus ST = 1 is a 1-partial explanation of BS = 1 relative to (C,P ).
That is, ST = 1 is a partial explanation of BS = 1 relative to (C,P ) with explanatory power 1.
As for computation, we assume that the above probability functions P on C are computable in polynomial time.
2.5. Responsibility and blame
We finally recall the notions of responsibility and blame from [3]. Intuitively, the notion of responsibility is a
refinement of the notion of actual cause, which also measures the minimal number of changes that must be made
under a structural contingency to create a counterfactual dependence of φ from X = x. Whereas the notion of blame
then also takes into consideration the belief of an agent about the possible causal models and contexts (before setting
the weak cause).
In the sequel, let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and let φ be an event.
Let us call the pair (M,u) a situation. Then, the degree of responsibility of X = x for φ in situation (M,u), denoted
dr((M,u),X = x,φ), is 0 if X = x is not an actual cause of φ under u in M , and it is 1/(k+1) if X = x is an actual
cause of φ under u in M , and
(i) some W ⊆ V \X, x ∈ D(X), and w ∈ D(W) exist such that AC2(a) and (b) hold and that k variables in W have
different values in w and W(u), and
(ii) no W ⊆ V \ X, x′ ∈ D(X), and w ∈ D(W) exist such that AC2(a) and (b) hold and that k′ < k variables in W
have different values in w and W(u).
Informally, dr((M,u),X = x,φ) = 1/(k+1), where k is the minimal number of changes that have to be made under
u in M to make φ counterfactually depend on X = x. In particular, if X = x is not an actual cause of φ under u in M ,
then k = ∞, and thus dr((M,u),X = x,φ)= 0. Otherwise, dr((M,u),X = x,φ) is at most 1.
Example 2.6 (rock throwing cont’d). Consider again the context u1,1 = (1,1) in which both Suzy and Billy intend to
throw a rock. As argued in Example 2.2, Suzy’s throwing a rock (ST = 1) is an actual cause of the bottle shattering
(BS = 1), witnessed by the contingency that Billy does not throw (and hence does not hit). Here, AC2 holds also
under the contingency that Billy throws a rock, but the rock does not hit the bottle (BT and BH are set to 1 and 0,
respectively). Since BT and BH are 1 and 0, respectively, under u1,1, the degree of responsibility of Suzy’s throwing
a rock (ST = 1) for the bottle shattering (BS = 1) in (M,u1,1) is given by 1.
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of blame of setting X to x for φ relative to an epistemic state (K,P ), denoted db(K,P ,X ← x,φ), is defined as∑
(M,u)∈K
dr
(
(MX=x, u),X = x,φ
) · P ((M,u)).
Informally, (K,P ) are the situations that an agent considers possible before X is set to x along with their probabilities
believed by the agent. Then, db(K,P ,X ← x,φ) is the expected degree of responsibility of X = x for φ in (MX=x, u).
Example 2.7 (rock throwing cont’d). Suppose that we are computing the degree of blame of Suzy’s throwing a rock
for the bottle shattering. Assume that Suzy considers possible a modified version of the causal model given in Ex-
ample 2.1, denoted M ′, where Billy may also throw extra hard, which is expressed by the additional value 2 of UB
and BT . If Billy throws extra hard, then Billy’s rock hits the bottle independently of what Suzy does, which is ex-
pressed by additionally assuming that BH is 1 if BT is 2. Assume then that Suzy considers possible the contexts u1,0,
u1,1, and u1,2, where Suzy throws a rock, and Billy either does not throw a rock, throws a rock in a normal way, or
throws a rock extra hard. Finally, assume that each of the three contexts has the probability 1/3. It is then not difficult
to verify that the degree of responsibility of Suzy’s throwing a rock for the bottle shattering is 1/2 in (M ′, u1,2) and 1
in both (M ′, u1,0) and (M ′, u1,1). Thus, the degree of blame of Suzy’s throwing a rock for the bottle shattering is 5/6.
3. Causes and explanations in first-order reasoning about actions
The work [9] presents a combination of the structural-model approach with first-order reasoning about actions in
Poole’s independent choice logic (ICL) [32,33]. It shows how the ICL can be extended by structure-based causes
and explanations, and thus how structure-based concepts can be made available in first-order reasoning about actions.
From another perspective, it also shows how first-order modeling capabilities and explicit actions can be added to the
structural-model approach.
From a technical point of view, this combination is based on a mapping of first-order theories in the ICL to binary
causal models via some grounding step. The generated causal models have a subset of the Herbrand base as set of
endogenous variables, and thus they generally have a quite large number of variables. Hence, for this combination
of the structural-model approach with first-order reasoning about actions in the ICL it is important to have efficient
techniques for deciding and computing structure-based causal concepts in large causal models. An important structural
feature of the large causal models that are generated from first-order theories in the ICL is that they have a natural
layering through the time line. Hence, they are a special kind of layered causal graphs, which we will describe in
Section 8 below as one important class of causal models for which deciding and computing causes and explanations
is tractable under suitable restrictions.
Roughly, ICL-theories are defined as follows. A choice space C is a set of pairwise disjoint and nonempty subsets
of the Herbrand base, called the alternatives of C. The elements of the alternatives of C are called the atomic choices
of C. A total choice of C is a set of atomic choices B such that |B∩A| = 1 for all alternatives A of C. An independent
choice logic theory (or ICL-theory) T = (C,L) consists of a choice space C and an acyclic logic program L such that
no atomic choice in C coincides with the head of any clause in the grounding of L. Semantically, every total choice
of C along with the acyclic logic program L produces a first-order model [9]. Hence, T = (C,L) encodes the set of
all such models. Every total choice and thus every first-order model is often also associated with a probability value.
It is not difficult to see that there is a natural relationship between binary structure-based causal models M =
(U,V,F ) and ICL-theories T = (C,L): (i) The exogenous variables in U along with their domains correspond to
the alternatives of C along with their atomic choices, (ii) the endogenous variables in V along with their binary
domains correspond to the ground atoms of T that do not act as atomic choices, along with their binary truth values,
(iii) the functions in F correspond to collections of clauses with the same head in the grounding of L, and (iv) a
probability function on the contexts in D(U) corresponds to a probability function on the atomic choices of C. This
natural relationship nicely supports the definition of structure-based causes and explanations in the ICL. The following
example illustrates ICL-theories and structure-based causes in ICL-theories.
Example 3.1 (mobile robot). Consider a mobile robot, which can navigate in an environment and pick up objects. We
assume the constants r1 (robot), o1 and o2 (two objects), p1 and p2 (two positions), and 0,1, . . . , h (time points within
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T ∈ {0,1, . . . , h}, X ∈ {r1, o1, o2}, and Pos ∈ {p1,p2}, which encode that the robot r1 is carrying the object O at
time T (where we assume that at any time T the robot can hold at most one object), and that the robot or object X
is at the position Pos at time T , respectively. The robot is endowed with the actions moveTo(Pos), pickUp(O), and
putDown(O), where Pos ∈ {p1,p2} and O ∈ {o1, o2}, which represent the actions “move to the position P ”, “pick up
the object O”, and “put down the object O”, respectively. The action pickUp(O) is stochastic: It is not reliable, and
thus can fail. Furthermore, we have the predicates do(A,T ), which represents the execution of an action A at time T ,
and fa(A,T ) (resp., su(A,T )), which represents the failure (resp., success) of an action A executed at time T . An
ICL-theory (C,L) is then given as follows. The choice space C encodes that picking up an object oi ∈ {o1, o2} at time
t ∈ {0,1, . . . , h} may fail (fa(pickUp(oi), t)) or succeed (su(pickUp(oi), t)):
C = {{fa(pickUp(oi), t), su(pickUp(oi), t)} | i ∈ {1,2}, t ∈ {0,1, . . . , h}}.
The acyclic logic program L consists of the clauses below, which encode the following knowledge:
• The robot is carrying the object O at time T + 1, if either (i) the robot and the object O were both at Pos at time
T , and the robot was not carrying any object and successfully picking up the object O at time T , or (ii) the robot
was carrying the object O and not putting it down at time T .
(1) carrying(O, T + 1)⇐ (¬carrying(o1, T )∧¬carrying(o2, T )∧ at(r1,Pos, T )∧ at(O,Pos, T )∧
do(pickUp(O),T )∧ su(pickUp(O),T ))∨ (carrying(O,T )∧¬do(putDown(O),T )).
• The robot is at Pos at time T + 1, if either (i) it moved to Pos at time T , or (ii) it was at Pos and did not move
away at time T .
(2) at(r1,Pos, T + 1)⇐ do(moveTo(Pos), T ) ∨ (at(r1,Pos, T )∧¬do(moveTo(Pos′), T )∧ Pos = Pos′).
• The object O is at Pos at time T + 1, if either (i) the object was at Pos and not carried by the robot at time T , or
(ii) the robot was carrying the object O and moved to Pos at time T , or (iii) the object was at Pos and carried by
the robot, who did not move away at time T .
(3) at(O,Pos, T + 1)⇐ (¬carrying(O,T )∧ at(O,Pos, T )) ∨ (carrying(O,T )∧ do(moveTo(Pos), T ))∨
(carrying(O,T ) ∧ at(O,Pos, T )∧¬do(moveTo(Pos′), T )∧ Pos = Pos′).
• The object o1 is at the position p2 at time 0.
(4) at(o1,p2,0)⇐ .
• The robot is at the position p2 at time 0.
(5) at(r1,p2,0)⇐ .
Consider the horizon h = 3 and suppose that picking up an object succeeds at every time t ∈ {0,1,2,3}, which is
encoded by the total choice
B = {su(pickUp(oi), t) | i ∈ {1,2}, t ∈ {0,1,2,3}}.
Suppose that the robot executes a pick up of o1 at time 0, a move to p1 at time 1, and a pick up of o2 at time 2, which
is represented by the additional facts
E = {do(pickUp(o1),0),do(moveTo(p1),1),do(pickUp(o2),2)}.
The structural-model approach now allows to give a semantics to causal statements in the ICL such as e.g. “the
object o1 being at position p2 at time 0 is an actual cause of the robot not carrying the object o2 at time 3 under the
above B in T ∪ E”. Intuitively, the robot and the object o1 are both at position p2 at time 0. Hence, picking up o1
succeeds at time 0, the robot moves with o1 to position p1 at time 1, there its picking up o2 fails at time 2, and this
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position p1, then the robot would hold no object at time 2, and its picking up o2 at time 2 would succeed, and thus the
robot would then be carrying o2 at time 3.
Observe that the grounding step produces a causal model that has, even in this simple example, more than 90
variables (for a horizon h  0, we have 24 · (h + 1) variables), which largely increases if we have more than only
two positions and two objects different from the robot. Furthermore, the causal graph of this causal model is naturally
layered through the time line (and thus has the structure of a layered causal graph as described in Section 8 below).
4. Problem statements
We concentrate on the following important computational problems for causes, explanations, responsibility, and
blame in the structural-model approach, which comprise both decision problems and problems with concrete output.
4.1. Causes
WEAK/ACTUAL CAUSE: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), u ∈D(U), and an event φ, decide if X = x is a
weak (resp., an actual) cause of φ under u.
WEAK/ACTUAL CAUSE COMPUTATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , u ∈ D(U), and an event φ, compute the
set of all X′ = x′ such that (i) X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X′), and (ii) X′ = x′ is a weak (resp., an actual) cause of
φ under u.
4.2. Notions of explanations
EXPLANATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), an event φ, and a set of contexts C ⊆ D(U), decide
whether X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C.
EXPLANATION COMPUTATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , an event φ, and a set of contexts C ⊆ D(U), com-
pute the set of all X′ = x′ such that (i) X′ ⊆X and x′ ∈D(X′), and (ii) X′ = x′ is an explanation of φ relative
to C.
α-PARTIAL EXPLANATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), an event φ, a set of contexts C ⊆D(U) such
that φ(u) for all u ∈ C, a probability function P on C, and α  0, decide if X = x is an α-partial explanation
of φ relative to (C,P ).
α-PARTIAL EXPLANATION COMPUTATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , an event φ, a set of contexts C ⊆D(U)
with φ(u) for all u ∈ C, a probability function P on C, and α  0, compute the set of all X′ = x′ such that (i)
X′ ⊆X and x′ ∈D(X′), and (ii) X′ = x′ is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ).
PARTIAL EXPLANATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), an event φ, a set of contexts C ⊆ D(U) such
that φ(u) for all u ∈ C, and a probability function P on C, decide whether X = x is a partial explanation of φ
relative to (C,P ).
PARTIAL EXPLANATION COMPUTATION: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , an event φ, a set of contexts C ⊆ D(U)
such that φ(u) for all u ∈ C, and a probability function P on C, compute the set of all X′ = x′ such that
(i) X′ ⊆X and x′ ∈D(X′), and (ii) X′ = x′ is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ).
EXPLANATORY POWER: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), an event φ, a set of contexts C ⊆ D(U), and a
probability function P on C, where (i) φ(u) for all u ∈ C, and (i) X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative
to (C,P ), compute the explanatory power of X = x for φ relative to (C,P ).
4.3. Responsibility and blame
RESPONSIBILITY: Given M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), and an event φ, compute the degree of
responsibility of X = x for φ in (M,u).
BLAME: Given an epistemic state E , a set of endogenous variables X , x ∈D(X), and an event φ, compute the degree
of blame of setting X to x for φ relative to E .
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Several complexity results for the above problems have been established (considering the notion of weak cause
as defined in [15,16]). In particular, as shown in [6], the decision problems WEAK CAUSE and ACTUAL CAUSE are
both P2 -complete in the general case, and NP-complete in the case of binary variables. Furthermore, as shown in
[7], the decision problems EXPLANATION and PARTIAL/α-PARTIAL EXPLANATION and the optimization problem
EXPLANATORY POWER are complete for DP2, P
P2‖ , and FP
P2‖ , respectively, in the general case, and complete for
DP, PNP‖ and FPNP‖ , respectively, in the binary case. Here DP2 (resp., DP) is the “logical conjunction” of P2 and P2
(resp., NP and co-NP), and PC‖ (resp., FPC‖ ) is the class of decision problems solvable (resp., functions computable)
in polynomial time with access to one round of parallel queries to an oracle in C. Finally, Chockler and Halpern [3]
and Chockler, Halpern, and Kupferman [4] have shown that the optimization problems RESPONSIBILITY and BLAME
are complete for the classes FPP2 [logn] and FP
P
2‖ , respectively, in the general case, and complete for FPNP[logn] and
FPNP‖ , respectively, in the binary case. The class FPC[logn] contains the functions computable in polynomial time with
O(logn) many calls to an oracle in C, where n is the size of the problem input.
To our knowledge, there exist no complexity results for the optimization problems WEAK/ACTUAL CAUSE COM-
PUTATION, EXPLANATION COMPUTATION, and α-PARTIAL/PARTIAL EXPLANATION COMPUTATION so far. But
there are complexity results on decision variants of two of the latter problems, which are called EXPLANATION
EXISTENCE and α-PARTIAL EXPLANATION EXISTENCE, respectively. They are the decision problems of deciding
whether an explanation and an α-partial explanation, respectively, over certain variables exists, which are complete
for P3 (resp., P2 ) in the general (resp., binary) case; see [7].
To our knowledge, there are no explicit tractability results for the above problems related to causes and explanations
so far. As for responsibility and blame, Chockler, Halpern, and Kupferman [4] have shown that computing the degree
of responsibility in read-once Boolean formulas can be done in linear time.
5. Irrelevant variables
In this section, we describe how an instance of deciding weak cause can be reduced with polynomial overhead
to an equivalent instance in which the (potential) weak cause and the causal model may contain fewer variables.
That is, such reductions identify and remove irrelevant variables in weak causes and also in causal models. This
can be regarded as an important preliminary step in the computation of weak and actual causes, which seems to be
indispensable in efficient implementations.
We first describe a reduction from [7] and a generalization thereof in which irrelevant variables in weak causes
X = x of an event φ are characterized and removed. We then generalize these two reductions to two new reductions
that identify and remove irrelevant variables in weak causes X = x of φ and also in causal models M , producing the
reduced and the strongly reduced causal model of M w.r.t. X = x and an event φ. Both new reductions also generalize
a reduction due to Hopkins [21] for events of the form X = x and φ = Y = y, where X and Y are singletons. The
reduced causal model of M w.r.t. X = x and φ is in general larger than its strong reduct w.r.t. X = x and φ. But the
former allows for deciding whether X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ, for the large class of all X′ ⊆ X, while the latter
generally allows only for deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ.
In the rest of this section, to illustrate the removal of variables in (potential) weak causes and causal models, we
use what is shown in Fig. 2: (i) the causal graph GV (M) of a causal model M = (U,V,F ), (ii) the set of variables
X ⊆ V of a (potential) weak cause X = x, and (iii) the set of variables V (φ) in an event φ.
5.1. Reducing weak causes
The following result (essentially proved in [7]) shows that deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u
is reducible to deciding whether X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of φ under u, where X′ is the set of all Xi ∈ X that are
either in φ or ancestors of variables in φ. That is, in deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u, we can
safely ignore all variables in X = x not connected to any variable in φ.
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Fig. 3. Causal graph GV (M) along with X′ and V (φ).
Theorem 5.1. (Essentially [7]) Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), let φ be an event,
and let u ∈ D(U). Let X′ be the set of all variables in X from which a (directed) path exists in G(M) to a variable
in φ, and let x′ = x|X′. Then, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff (i) (X \X′)(u) = x|(X \X′) and (ii) X′ = x′ is
a weak cause of φ under u.
Example 5.1. Fig. 3 shows X′ for a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and an event φ such that the causal graph GV (M)
and the sets X and V (φ) are as in Fig. 2.
The next theorem formulates the more general result that deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under
u is reducible to deciding whether X′ = x|X′ is a weak cause of φ under u, where X′ is the set of all variables in
X that occur in φ or that are ancestors of variables in φ not “blocked” by other variables in X. That is, in deciding
whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u, we can even ignore every variable in X = x not connected via variables
in V \X to any variable in φ.
Theorem 5.2. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈D(X), let φ be an event, and let u ∈D(U).
Let X′ be the set of all variables Xi ∈ X from which there exists a path in G(M) to a variable in φ that contains
no Xj ∈ X \ {Xi}, and let x′ = x|X′. Then, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff (i) (X \X′)(u) = x|(X \X′) and
(ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u.
Example 5.2. Fig. 4 shows X′ for a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and an event φ such that the causal graph GV (M)
and the sets X and V (φ) are as in Fig. 2.
The next result shows that computing the set of all variables in a weak cause that are not irrelevant according to
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 can be done in linear time.
Proposition 5.3. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , and an event φ,
(a) computing the set X′ of all variables Xi ∈ X from which a path exists to a variable in φ can be done in time
O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖);
(b) computing the set X′ of all variables Xi ∈ X from which a path exists to a variable in φ that contains no Xj ∈
X \ {Xi} can be done in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖).
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φ
X
) along with X′ =X ∩Rφ
X
(M) and V (φ).
5.2. Reducing weak causes and causal models
We now generalize the reduction described in Theorem 5.1 to a reduction which not only removes irrelevant
variables from causes, but also removes irrelevant variables in causal models. In the sequel, let M = (U,V,F ) be a
causal model. Let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and let φ be an event. We first define irrelevant variables w.r.t.
X = x and φ, and then the reduced causal model w.r.t. X = x and φ, which does not contain these irrelevant variables
anymore.
The set of relevant endogenous variables of M = (U,V,F ) w.r.t. X = x and φ, denoted RφX=x(M), is the set of all
variables A ∈ V from which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable in φ. A variable A ∈ V is irrelevant w.r.t.
X = x and φ iff it is not relevant w.r.t. X = x and φ. Note that it does not necessarily hold that X ⊆ RφX=x(M). The
reduced causal model of M = (U,V,F ), where F = {FA | A ∈ V }, w.r.t. X = x and φ, denoted MφX=x , is the causal
model M ′ = (U,V ′,F ′), where V ′ = RφX=x(M) and F ′ = {F ′A | A ∈ V ′} with F ′A = FA for all A ∈ V ′. We often use
R
φ
X(M), R
Y
X (M), M
φ
X , and M
Y
X to abbreviate R
φ
X=x(M), R
Y=y
X=x(M), M
φ
X=x , and M
Y=y
X=x , respectively.
Example 5.3. Fig. 5 shows the causal graph GV (MφX) along with the set of variables X′ = X ∩ RφX(M) for a causal
model M = (U,V,F ) and an event φ such that the causal graph GV (M) and the sets X and V (φ) are as in Fig. 2.
The following result shows that a variable in X = x is irrelevant w.r.t. X = x and φ iff it is not connected to a
variable in φ. Hence, we are heading towards a generalization of the reduction in Theorem 5.1.
Proposition 5.4. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and let φ be an event. Then, X ∩
R
φ
X(M) is the set of all variables B ∈X from which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable in φ.
The next result shows that deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M can be reduced to decid-
ing whether X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in MφX , where X′ = X ∩ RφX(M) and x′ = x|X′. It generalizes
Theorem 5.1. Note that this result and also Theorems 5.7 and 5.10 below do not carry over to responsibility.
Theorem 5.5. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and let φ be an event.
Let X′ =X∩RφX(M) and x′ = x|X′. Then, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (i) (X \X′)(u)= x|(X \X′)
in M , and (ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in Mφ .X
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model of M w.r.t. X = x and φ coincides with the reduced causal model of M w.r.t. X′ = x′ and φ.
Proposition 5.6. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X,X′ ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and x′ ∈ D(X′), and let φ be an
event. Then, MφX coincides with M
φ
X′ .
We are now ready to formulate the main result of this section. The following theorem shows that deciding whether
X′ = x′, where X′ ⊆ X, is a weak cause of φ under u in M can be reduced to deciding whether its restriction to
R
φ
X(M) is a weak cause of φ under u in M
φ
X . It is a generalization of Theorems 5.1 and 5.5, which follows from
Theorem 5.5 and Proposition 5.6.
Theorem 5.7. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X′ ⊆ X ⊆ V , x′ ∈ D(X′), x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and
let φ be an event. Let X′′ = X′ ∩ RφX(M) and x′′ = x′|X′′. Then, X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff
(i) (X′ \X′′)(u) = x′|(X′ \X′′) in M , and (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u in MφX .
The following result shows that the reduced causal model and the restriction of its causal graph to the set of
endogenous variables can be computed in linear time.
Proposition 5.8. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and an event φ, the directed graph
GV (M
φ
X) and the causal model M
φ
X can be computed in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖).
5.3. Strongly reducing weak causes and causal models
In the sequel, let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and let φ be an event.
The reduced causal model w.r.t. X = x and φ, which generalizes the idea behind Theorem 5.1, still contains some
superfluous variables for deciding whether X = x is a weak causes of φ under u in M . We now define the strongly
reduced causal model w.r.t. X = x and φ, which generalizes the idea behind Theorem 5.2, where these superfluous
variables are removed. We first define strongly relevant variables w.r.t. X = x and φ, and then the strongly reduced
causal model w.r.t. X = x and φ, which contains only such variables.
The set of strongly relevant endogenous variables of M = (U,V,F ) w.r.t. X = x and φ, denoted R̂ φX=x(M), is
the set of all variables A ∈ V from which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable in φ that contains no
Xj ∈ X \ {A}. Observe that R̂ φX=x(M) ⊆ RφX=x(M). The strongly reduced causal model of M = (U,V,F ), where
F = {FA | A ∈ V }, w.r.t. X = x and φ, denoted M̂φX=x , is the causal model M ′ = (U,V ′,F ′), where V ′ = R̂ φX=x(M)
and F ′ = {F ′A |A ∈ V ′} with F ′A = FA for all A ∈ V ′ ∩X and F ′A = FA for all A ∈ V ′ \X. Here, FA assigns AM(uA)
to A for every value uA ∈D(UA) of the set UA of all ancestors B ∈U of A in G(M). We often use R̂ φX(M), R̂ YX (M),
M̂
φ
X , and M̂YX to abbreviate R̂
φ
X=x(M), R̂
Y=y
X=x(M), M̂
φ
X=x , and M̂
Y=y
X=x , respectively.
Example 5.4. Fig. 6 shows the causal graph GV (M̂φX) along with the set of variables X′ = X ∩ R̂ φX(M) for a causal
model M = (U,V,F ) and an event φ such that the causal graph GV (M) and the sets X and V (φ) are as in Fig. 2.
Fig. 6. Causal graph GV (M̂
φ
X
) along with X′ =X ∩ R̂ φ
X
(M) and V (φ).
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G(M) via variables in V \X to a variable in φ. Thus, we are currently elaborating a generalization of Theorem 5.2.
Proposition 5.9. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and let φ be an event. Then, X ∩
R̂
φ
X(M) is the set of all Xi ∈ X from which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable in φ that contains
no Xj ∈X \ {Xi}.
It is easy to verify that both Proposition 5.6 and Theorem 5.7 do not carry over to strongly reduced causal models.
Informally, if X′ ⊆ X, then M̂φ
X′ may contain variables that connect some Xi ∈ V to a variable in φ via variables in
V \X′, but that do not connect Xi ∈ V to a variable in φ via variables in V \X ⊆ V \X′, since some variable from
X \X′ is needed, and are thus not contained in M̂φX . For example, if the causal graph GV (M) and the sets X and V (φ)
are as in Fig. 2, and X′ consists of the variable in X that is shown upper left in Fig. 2, then this variable does not occur
among the variables of the strongly reduced causal model M̂φX , since it is pruned away (cf. also Fig. 6).
However, the weaker result in Theorem 5.5 also holds for strongly reduced causal models. That is, deciding whether
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M can be reduced to deciding whether its restriction to the strongly relevant
variables is a weak cause of φ under u in M̂φX . This result generalizes Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.10. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and let φ be an event.
Let X′ =X∩ R̂ φX(M) and x′ = x|X′. Then, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (i) (X \X′)(u) = x|(X \X′)
in M , and (ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M̂φX .
The following result shows that the strongly reduced causal model and the restriction of its causal graph to the
set of all endogenous variables can be computed in polynomial and linear time, respectively. Here, for any set S, we
denote by |S| its cardinality.
Proposition 5.11. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), and an event φ, the directed graph
GV (M̂
φ
X) (resp., the causal model M̂φX) is computable in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖) (resp., O(|V |‖M‖ + ‖φ‖)).
6. Causal trees
In this section, we describe our first class of tractable cases of causes and explanations. We show that deciding
whether an atom X = x is a weak cause of a primitive event Y = y under a context u in a domain-bounded causal
model M = (U,V,F ) is tractable, if the strongly reduced causal model GV (M̂YX) is a bounded directed tree with root
Y , which informally consists of a directed path from X to Y , along with a number of parents for each variable in the
path after X bounded by a global constant (see Fig. 7). Under the same conditions, deciding whether X = x is an
actual cause, deciding whether X = x is an explanation relative to a set of contexts C, and deciding whether X = x is
a partial explanation or an α-partial explanation as well as computing its explanatory power relative to (C,P ) are all
tractable.
More precisely, we say that a directed graph G= (V ,E), given two nodes X,Y ∈ V , is a directed tree with root Y ,
if it consists of a unique directed path X =ˆP k → P k−1 → ·· · → P 0 =ˆY from X to Y , and sets Wi of (unconnected)
parents A = P i for all P i−1 such that i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Moreover, G is bounded, if |Wi | l for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i.e.,
Pi−1 has fan-in of variables from V at most l + 1, where l is some global constant. If G = GV (M) for some causal
model M = (U,V,F ) and X,Y ∈ V , then M is a (bounded) causal tree with respect to X and Y .
Fig. 7. Path from X to Y in a causal tree.
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Example 6.1. An example of a causal tree is the following binary causal model M = (U,V,F ) presented in [16]
in a discussion of the double prevention problem, where U = {UBPT ,USPS} with D(A) = {0,1} for all A ∈ U , V =
{BPT,LE,LSS, SPS,SST,TD} with D(A) = {0,1} for all A ∈ V . In a World War III scenario, Suzy is piloting a
bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target, and Billy is piloting a fighter as her lone escort. Along comes an
enemy plane, piloted by Lucifer. Sharp-eyed Billy spots Lucifer, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Lucifer’s plane goes
down in flames. Suzy’s mission is undisturbed, and the bombing takes place as planned. The question is whether Billy
deserves some credit for the success of the mission. Here, BPT means that Billy pulls the trigger, LE that Lucifer
eludes Billy, LSS that Lucifer shoots Suzy, SPS that Suzy plans to shoot the target, SST that Suzy shoots the target,
and TD that the target is destroyed.
The set F = {FA | A ∈ V } consists of the functions FBPT = UBPT , FSPS = USPS, FLE = 1 − BPT , FLSS = LE,
FSST = 1 iff LSS = 0 and SPS = 1, and FTD = SST . The causal graph G(M) is shown in Fig. 8. Let X = BPT and
Y = TD. Then, GV (M) is a directed tree with root Y , where the directed path from X to Y is P 4 = BPT , P 3 = LE,
P 2 = LSS, P 1 = SST , P 0 = TD, W 1 =W 3 =W 4 = ∅ and W 2 = SPS.
As an important property, causal trees can be recognized very efficiently, namely in linear time. The same holds
for causal models whose reduced variant with respect to X and Y is a causal tree.
Proposition 6.1. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ) and variables X,Y ∈ V , deciding whether M resp. M̂XY is a
(unbounded or bounded) causal tree with respect to X and Y is feasible in O(‖M‖) time.
6.1. Characterizing weak causes
We first consider weak causes. In the sequel, let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X,Y ∈ V such that M is a
causal tree with respect to X and Y , and let x ∈D(X) and y ∈D(Y). We give a new characterization of X = x being
a weak cause of Y = y under context u ∈ D(U), which can be checked in polynomial time under some conditions.
We need some preparative definitions. We define R0 = {(D(Y ) \ {y}, {y})}, and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we define
pˆi = P i(u) and Ri by:
Ri = {(p,q) | p,q ⊆D(P i),∃w ∈D(Wi)∃(p′,q ′) ∈Ri−1 ∀p,q ∈D(P i):
p ∈ p iff P i−1pw (u) ∈ p′,
q ∈ q iff P i−1
qw′ (u),P
i−1
pˆjw′(u) ∈ q ′ for all W ′ ⊆Wi,w′ =w|W ′, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,min(i, k − 1)
}
.
Roughly, Ri is the set of all pairs (p,q), where p (resp., q) is a set of possible values of P i in AC2(a) (resp., (b)), for
different values of Wi . Here, P 0 =ˆ Y must be set to a value different from y (resp., to the value y), and the possible
values of each other P i depend on the possible values of P i−1. In summary, AC2(a) and (b) hold iff some (p,q) ∈Rk
exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q . This result is formally expressed by the following theorem, which can be proved by
induction on i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Theorem 6.2. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X,Y ∈ V , x ∈ D(X), y ∈ D(Y), and u ∈ D(U). Suppose
M is a causal tree w.r.t. X and Y , and let Rk be defined as above. Then, X = x is a weak cause of Y = y under u in
M iff (α) X(u)= x and Y(u) = y in M , and (β) some (p,q) ∈Rk exists with p = ∅ and x ∈ q .
Example 6.2. Consider again the causal tree with respect to X = BPT and Y = TD from Example 6.1. Suppose we
want to decide whether BPT = 1 is a weak cause of TD = 1 under a context u1,1 ∈ D(U), where u1,1(UBPT) =
1 and u1,1(USPS) = 1. Here, we obtain the relations R0 = {({0}, {1})}, R1 = {({0}, {1})}, R2 = {({1}, {0})}, R3 =
{({1}, {0})}, and R4 = {({0}, {1})}. Notice then that (α) BPT(u1,1) and TD(u1,1) are both 1, and (β) ({0}, {1}) ∈ R4,
{0} = ∅, and 1 ∈ {1}. By Theorem 6.2, it thus follows that BPT = 1 is a weak cause of TD = 1 under u1,1.
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The following theorem shows that deciding whether an atom X = x is a weak cause of a primitive event Y = y in
domain-bounded M is tractable, when M is a bounded causal tree with respect to X and Y . This result follows from
Theorem 6.2 and the recursive definition of Ri , which assures that Rk can be computed in polynomial time under
the above boundedness assumptions. By Theorem 2.3, the same tractability result holds for actual causes, since for
singletons X the notion of actual cause coincides with the notion of weak cause.
Theorem 6.3. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), variables X,Y ∈ V such that M is a bounded
causal tree with respect to X and Y , and values x ∈ D(X), y ∈ D(Y), and u ∈ D(U), deciding whether X = x is a
weak (resp., an actual) cause of Y = y under u in M can be done in polynomial time.
The next theorem shows that the same tractability result holds when instead of M just the reduced model M̂XY is
required to be a bounded causal tree. The result follows from Theorem 5.10, Proposition 5.11, and Theorem 6.3.
Theorem 6.4. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), variables X,Y ∈ V such that M̂YX is a bounded
causal tree with respect to X and Y , values x ∈ D(X), y ∈ D(Y), and u ∈ D(U), deciding whether X = x is a weak
(resp., an actual) cause of Y = y under u in M can be done in polynomial time.
6.3. Deciding explanations and partial explanations
The following theorem shows that deciding whether X = x is an explanation of Y = y relative to C in M is tractable
under the conditions of the previous subsection. This result follows from Theorem 6.4 and Proposition 2.2.
Theorem 6.5. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), variables X,Y ∈ V such that M̂YX is a bounded
causal tree with respect to X and Y , values x ∈ D(X) and y ∈ D(Y), and a set of contexts C ⊆ D(U), deciding
whether X = x is an explanation of Y = y relative to C in M can be done in polynomial time.
Similarly, deciding whether X = x is a partial or an α-partial explanation of Y = y relative to (C,P ) in M , as well
as computing its explanatory power is tractable under the conditions of the previous subsection. This follows from
Theorem 6.4 and Propositions 2.2 and 2.4.
Theorem 6.6. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a domain-bounded causal model, let X,Y ∈ V be such that M̂YX is a bounded
causal tree with respect to X and Y , and let x ∈D(X) and y ∈D(Y). Let C ⊆D(U) such that Y(u) = y for all u ∈ C,
and let P be a probability function on C. Then,
(a) deciding whether X = x is a partial explanation of Y = y relative to (C,P ) in M can be done in polynomial time;
(b) deciding whether X = x is an α-partial explanation of Y = y relative to (C,P ) in M , for some given α  0 can
be done in polynomial time;
(c) given that X = x is a partial explanation of Y = y relative to (C,P ) in M , the explanatory power of X = x is
computable in polynomial time.
7. Decomposable causal graphs
In this section, we generalize the characterization of weak cause given in Section 6 to more general events and to
more general causal graphs. We characterize relationships of the form “X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M”,
where (i) X = x and φ are as in the original definition of weak cause, and thus not restricted to assignments to single
variables anymore, and where (ii) GV (M) is decomposable into a chain of subgraphs (cf. Fig. 9, which is explained
in more detail below), and thus not restricted to causal trees anymore. We then use this result to obtain more general
tractability results for causes and explanations, and also new tractability results for responsibility and blame.
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7.1. Characterizing weak causes
We first give a new characterization of weak cause. In the sequel, let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X ⊆ V ,
let x ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U), and let φ be an event.
Towards a characterization of “X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M”, we define the notion of a decom-
position of a causal graph as follows. A decomposition of GV (M) relative to X = x (or simply X) and φ is a
tuple ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)), k  0, of pairs (T i, Si) such that the conditions D1–D6 hold:
D1. (T 0, . . . , T k) is an ordered partition of V .
D2. T 0 ⊇ S0, . . . , T k ⊇ Sk .
D3. Every A ∈ V occurring in φ belongs to T 0, and Sk ⊇X.
D4. For every i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, no two variables A ∈ T 0 ∪· · ·∪T i−1 ∪T i \Si and B ∈ T i+1 ∪· · ·∪T k are connected
by an arrow in GV (M).
D5. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, every child of a variable from Si in GV (M) belongs to (T i \ Si)∪ Si−1. Every child of
a variable from S0 belongs to (T 0 \ S0).
D6. For every i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, every parent of a variable in Si in GV (M) belongs to T i+1. There are no parents of
any variable A ∈ Sk .
Intuitively, GV (M) is decomposable into a chain of edge-disjoint subgraphs G0, . . . ,Gk over some sets of variables
T 0, S0 ∪ T 1, S1 ∪ T 2, . . . , Sk−1 ∪ T k , where (T 0, . . . , T k) is an ordered partition of V , such that the sets Ti are
connected to each other exactly through some sets Si ⊆ T i , i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, where (i) every arrow that is incident to
some A ∈ Si , i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, is either outgoing from A and belongs to Gi , or ingoing into A and belongs to Gi+1,
and (ii) every variable in φ (resp., X) belongs to T 0 (resp., some Sk ⊆ T k); see Fig. 9 for an illustration.
As easily seen, causal trees as in Section 6 are causal models with decomposable causal graphs. For the di-
rected path X =ˆ P k → P k−1 → ·· · → P 0 =ˆ Y from X to Y , and the sets Wi , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we may define
D = ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) by Si = {P i}, T 0 = {P 0}, and T i = Wi ∪ {P i}, for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}; then, D is a de-
composition of GV (M) relative to X = x and Y = y.
The width of a decomposition D = ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) of GV (M) relative to X and φ is the maximum of all
|T i | such that i ∈ {0, . . . , k}. We say that D is width-bounded iff the width of D is at most l for some global constant l.
Example 7.1. Fig. 10 shows a decomposition D = ((T 0, S0), (T 1, S1), (T 2, S2)) of a causal graph GV (M) relative to
a set of variables X ⊆ V and an event φ. The width of this decomposition D is given by 6.
We use such a decomposition ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) of GV (M) to extend the relations Ri for causal trees from
Section 6.1 to decomposable causal graphs. The new relations Ri now contain triples (p,q,F ), where p (resp., q)
specifies a set of possible values of “floating variables” F ⊆ Si in AC2(a) (resp., (b)). We define R0 as follows:
R0 = {(p,q,F ) | F ⊆ S0,p,q ⊆D(F),
∃W ⊆ T 0,F = S0 \W,
∃w ∈D(W) ∀p,q ∈D(F):
p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
q ∈ q iff φ ˆ ′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W,w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T 0 \ (Sk ∪W)
}
.[q〈Z(u)]w
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For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we then define Ri as follows:
Ri = {(p,q,F ) | F ⊆ Si,p,q ⊆D(F),
∃W ⊆ T i,F = Si \W,
∃w ∈D(W) ∃(p′,q ′,F ′) ∈Ri−1 ∀p,q ∈D(F):
p ∈ p iff F ′pw(u) ∈ p′,
q ∈ q iff F ′[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) ∈ q ′ for all W ′ ⊆W,w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T i \ (Sk ∪W)
}
.
Intuitively, rather than propagating sets of pairs (p,q) of possible values p and q of a single variable P i ∈ V in AC2(a)
and (b), respectively, from Y = P 0 back to X = P k along a path X =ˆP k → P k−1 → ·· · → P 0 =ˆY as in Section 6.1,
we now propagate triples (p,q,F ) consisting of some “floating variables” F ⊆ Si ⊆ V , a set p of possible values
of F in AC2(a), and a set q of possible values of F in AC2(b), from φ back to X ⊆ V along the chain of subgraphs
G0, . . . ,Gk over the sets of variables T 0, S0 ∪ T 1, S1 ∪ T 2, . . . , Sk−1 ∪ T k . Here, R0 contains all triples (p,q,F )
such that F ⊆ S0, p,q ⊆ D(F), p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u), and q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u), for all possible Zˆ and restrictions
w′ of some appropriate w. Moreover, the triples in Ri depend on the triples in Ri−1. In summary, it then follows that
AC2(a) and (b) hold iff some (p,q,X) ∈Rk exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q .
Note that for a decomposition corresponding to a causal tree as discussed above, for each (p,q,F ) in R0, it holds
that W = ∅ and F = {P 0}. Furthermore, for each (p,q,F ) in Ri , where i > 0, we have W =Wi and F = {P i}. That
is, the sets Ri defined for causal trees correspond to simplified versions of the sets Ri for a decomposed graph, where
the redundant component F is removed from each triple.
This new characterization of weak cause, which is based on the above concept of a decomposition of GV (M) and
the relations Ri , is expressed by the following theorem, which can be proved by induction on i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Theorem 7.1. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , let x ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U), and let φ be an event.
Let ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) be a decomposition of GV (M) relative to X and φ, and let Rk be defined as above. Then,
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (α) X(u) = x and φ(u) in M , and (β) some (p,q,X) ∈ Rk exists such
that p = ∅ and x ∈ q .
This result provides a basis for deciding and computing weak and actual causes, and may in particular be fruitfully
applied to reduced causal models from which irrelevant variables have been pruned. Often, reduced models have a
simple decomposition: Every M̂φX = (U,V ′,F ′) has the trivial decomposition ((V ′,X)), and every MφX = (U,V ′,F ′)
such that no A ∈ X is on a path from a different variable in X to a variable in φ also has the trivial decomposition
((V ′,X)).
7.2. Deciding and computing weak and actual causes
Using the characterization of weak cause given in Section 7.1, we now provide new tractability results for deciding
and computing weak and actual causes. The following theorem shows that deciding whether X = x is a weak (resp.,
an actual) cause of φ under u in a domain-bounded M is tractable when GV (M) has a width-bounded decomposition
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M can be done by recursively computing the Ri ’s and then deciding whether (α) and (β) of Theorem 7.1 hold. All
this can be done in polynomial time under the above boundedness assumptions. Since GV (M) has a width-bounded
decomposition, |X| is bounded by a constant, and thus the above tractability result also holds for actual causes.
Theorem 7.2. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), an event φ,
and a width-bounded decomposition D of GV (M) relative to X and φ, deciding whether X = x is a weak (resp., an
actual) cause of φ under u in M is possible in polynomial time.
The next theorem shows that deciding weak (resp., actual) causes in domain-bounded causal models is also tract-
able, when GV (MφX) has a width-bounded decomposition provided in the input. This result essentially combines
Theorems 5.7 and 7.2.
Theorem 7.3. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X′ ⊆X ⊆ V , x′ ∈D(X′), u ∈D(U), an event
φ, and a width-bounded decomposition D of the graph GV (MφX) relative to X′ ∩ RφX(M) and φ, deciding whether
X′ = x′ is a weak (resp., an actual) cause of φ under u in M is possible in polynomial time.
A similar result also holds for strongly reduced causal models. It is expressed by the following theorem, which
basically combines Theorems 5.10 and 7.2.
Theorem 7.4. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), u ∈D(U), an event φ, and
a width-bounded decomposition D of the graph GV (M̂φX) relative to X ∩ R̂ φX(M) and φ, deciding whether X = x is
a weak (resp., an actual) cause of φ under u in M is possible in polynomial time.
We finally focus on computing weak and actual causes. Th e following result shows that, given some X ⊆ V ,
computing all weak (resp., actual) causes X′ = x′, where X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X′), of φ under u in domain-bounded
M is tractable, when either (a) GV (MφX) has a width-bounded decomposition relative to X and φ provided in the
input, or (b) every GV (M̂φX′) with X′ ⊆ X has a width-bounded decomposition relative to X′ and φ provided in the
input. This result essentially follows from Theorems 7.3 and 7.4. Note that in Theorems 7.5 to 7.9, each of (a) and (b)
implies that |X| is bounded by a constant, and thus also the number of all subsets X′ ⊆ X is bounded by a constant.
Theorems 7.5 to 7.9 also hold, when the decompositions are relative to X ∩RφX(M) and X′ ∩ R̂ φX′(M) rather than X
and X′, respectively.
Theorem 7.5. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , u ∈ D(U), an event φ, and either
(a) a width-bounded decomposition D of the graph GV (MφX) relative to X and φ, or (b) for every X′ ⊆ X, a width-
bounded decomposition DX′ of GV (M̂φX′) relative to X′ and φ, computing the set of all X′ = x′, where X′ ⊆ X and
x′ ∈D(X′), such that X′ = x′ is a weak (resp., an actual) cause of φ under u in M is possible in polynomial time.
7.3. Deciding and computing explanations and partial explanations
We now turn to deciding and computing explanations and partial explanations. The following theorem shows that
deciding whether X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C ⊆ D(U) in M can be done in polynomial time, if we
assume the same restrictions as in Theorem 7.5. This result follows from Theorems 7.3 and 7.4.
Theorem 7.6. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), C ⊆ D(U), an event φ,
and either (a) a width-bounded decomposition D of GV (MφX) relative to X and φ, or (b) for each X′ ⊆ X, a width-
bounded decompositionDX′ of GV (M̂φX′) relative to X′ and φ, deciding whether X = x is an explanation of φ relative
to C in M can be done in polynomial time.
A similar tractability result holds for deciding whether X = x is a partial or an α-partial explanation of φ relative
to some (C,P ) in M , and for computing the explanatory power of a partial explanation.
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where φ(u) for all u ∈ C, a probability function P on C, and either (a) a width-bounded decomposition D of GV (MφX)
relative to X and φ, or (b) for every X′ ⊆X, a width-bounded decomposition DX′ of GV (M̂φX′) relative to X′ and φ,
(1) deciding whether X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) in M can be done in polynomial time;
(2) deciding whether X = x is an α-partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) in M , for some given α  0, can be
done in polynomial time;
(3) given that X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) in M , computing the explanatory power of X = x
can be done in polynomial time.
Such tractability results also hold for computing explanations and partial explanations. In particular, the next the-
orem shows that computing all explanations involving variables from a given set of endogenous variables is tractable
under the same assumptions as in Theorem 7.5.
Theorem 7.8. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V, C ⊆ D(U), an event φ, and either
(a) a width-bounded decomposition D of GV (MφX) relative to X and φ, or (b) for every X′ ⊆ X, a width-bounded
decompositionDX′ of GV (M̂φX′) relative to X′ and φ, computing the set of all X′ = x′, where X′ ⊆X and x′ ∈D(X′),
such that X′ = x′ is an explanation of φ relative to C in M can be done in polynomial time.
Similarly, also computing all partial and α-partial explanations involving variables from a given set of endogenous
variables is tractable under the same restrictions as in Theorem 7.5.
Theorem 7.9. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , C ⊆ D(U), an event φ, where φ(u)
for all u ∈ C, a probability function P on C, and either (a) a width-bounded decomposition D of GV (MφX) relative
to X and φ, or (b) for every X′ ⊆X, a width-bounded decomposition DX′ of GV (M̂φX′) relative to X′ and φ,
(1) computing the set of all X′ = x′, where X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X′), such that X′ = x′ is a partial explanation of φ
relative to (C,P ) in M can be done in polynomial time;
(2) computing the set of all X′ = x′ where X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X′), such that X′ = x′ is an α-partial explanation of
φ relative to (C,P ) in M , for some given α  0, can be done in polynomial time.
7.4. Computing degrees of responsibility and blame
We now show that the tractability results for deciding and computing causes and explanations of Sections 7.2 and
7.3 can also be extended to computing degrees of responsibility and blame. To this end, we slightly generalize the
relations Ri , i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, of Section 7.1.
We use the following notation. For sets of variables X and values x, x′ ∈ D(X), the difference between x and x′,
denoted diff(x, x′), is the number of all variables A ∈X such that x(A) = x′(A).
We define R0 as follows:
R0 = {(p,q,F, l) | F ⊆ S0,p,q ⊆D(F), l ∈ {0, . . . , |T 0|},
∃W ⊆ T 0,F = S0 \W,
∃w ∈D(W) ∀p,q ∈D(F):
l = diff(w,W(u)), p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W,w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T 0 \ (Sk ∪W)
}
.
For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we then define Ri as follows:
Ri = {(p,q,F, l) | F ⊆ Si,p,q ⊆D(F), l ∈ {0, . . . ,∑ij=0|T j |},
∃W ⊆ T i,F = Si \W,
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l = diff(w,W(u))+ l′, p ∈ p iff F ′pw(u) ∈ p′,
q ∈ q iff F ′[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) ∈ q ′ for all W ′ ⊆W,w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T i \ (Sk ∪W)}.
Intuitively, rather than triples (p,q,F ), the new relations Ri contain tuples (p,q, F, l), where p (resp., q) is a set
of possible values of F ⊆ Si in AC2(a) (resp., (b)) as in Section 7.1, and l is the sum of all differences between
w ∈ D(W) and W(u) in T j for all j ∈ {0, . . . , i}. Thus, AC2 holds with some W ⊆ V \ X and w ∈ D(W) such
that diff(w,W(u)) = l iff some (p,q,X, l) ∈ Rk exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q . This result is expressed by the
following theorem.
Theorem 7.10. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , let x ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U), and let φ be an event.
Let ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) be a decomposition of GV (M) relative to X and φ, and let Rk be defined as above. Then,
AC2 holds with some W ⊆ V \ X and w ∈ D(W) such that diff(w,W(u)) = l iff some (p,q,X, l) ∈ Rk exists such
that p = ∅ and x ∈ q .
The next theorem shows that the degree of responsibility of X = x for φ in a situation (M,u) with domain-
bounded M can be computed in polynomial time given that GV (M) has a width-bounded decomposition provided in
the input. It follows from Theorem 7.10 and the fact that recursively computing the Ri ’s and deciding whether there
exists some (p,q,X, l) ∈ Rk with p = ∅ and x ∈ q can be done in polynomial time under the above boundedness
assumptions.
Theorem 7.11. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈ D(X), u ∈ D(U), an event φ,
and a width-bounded decomposition D of GV (M) relative to X and φ, computing the degree of responsibility of
X = x for φ in (M,u) is possible in polynomial time.
Similarly, computing the degree of blame relative to an epistemic state (K,P ) is tractable, when every causal model
in K satisfies the same boundedness assumptions as in Theorem 7.11. This is expressed by the following theorem.
Theorem 7.12. Given an epistemic state (K,P ), where for every (M,u) ∈ K, M is domain-bounded, a set of en-
dogenous variables X, a value x ∈ D(X), an event φ, and for every (M,u) = ((U,V,F ),u) ∈ K a width-bounded
decomposition of GV (M) relative to X and φ, computing the degree of blame of setting X to x for φ relative to (K,P )
is possible in polynomial time.
7.5. Computing decompositions
The tractability results of Sections 7.2 to 7.4 are all based on the assumption that some decomposition of GV (M)
is provided in the input. It thus remains to decide whether such decompositions exist at all, and if so, then to compute
one, especially one of minimal width. The problem of deciding whether there exists some decomposition of width
below a given integer l > 0 is formally expressed as follows.
LAYERWIDTH WITH CONSTRAINTS: Given GV (M) for M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , an event φ, and an integer l > 0,
decide whether there exists a decomposition ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) of GV (M) relative to X and φ of width
at most l.
As shown by Hopkins [22], LAYERWIDTH WITH CONSTRAINTS is NP-complete. Hopkins [22] also presents an
algorithm for computing a layer decomposition of lowest width, where a layer decomposition satisfies every condition
among D1 to D6 except for D3. It is an any-time depth-first branch-and-bound algorithm, which searches through a
binary search tree that represents the set of all possible layer decompositions. This algorithm can also be used to
compute the set of all decompositions of GV (M) relative to X and φ of lowest width.
The intractability of computing a decomposition of lowest width, which is a consequence of the NP-completeness
of LAYERWIDTH WITH CONSTRAINTS, is not such a negative result as it might appear at first glance. It means that
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good performance. However, the effort for decomposition pays off by subsequent polynomial-time solvability of a
number of reasoning tasks given that the ramifying conditions are met, such that overall, the effort is polynomial
time modulo calls to an NP-oracle. This complexity is lower than the complexity of weak and actual causes, as well
as the complexity of explanations in the general case, which are located at the second and the third level of the
Polynomial Hierarchy, respectively [6,7] (see also Section 4.4). On the other hand, the lower complexity means that
suitable decompositions will not always exist. However, the worst-case complexity results in [6,7] use quite artificial
constructions, and the causal models involved will hardly occur in practice. In fact, many of the examples in the
literature seem to have decomposable causal graphs; it remains to be seen whether this holds for a growing stock of
applications.
8. Layered causal graphs
In general, as described in Section 7.5, causal graphs GV (M) with width-bounded decompositions cannot be
efficiently recognized, and such decompositions also cannot be efficiently computed. But, from Section 6, we already
know width-bounded causal trees as a large class of causal graphs, which have width-bounded decompositions that
can be computed in linear time. In this section, we discuss an even larger class of causal graphs, called layered causal
graphs, which also have natural nontrivial decompositions that can be computed in linear time. Intuitively, in layered
causal graphs GV (M), the set of endogenous variables V can be partitioned into layers S0, . . . , Sk such that every
arrow in GV (M) goes from a variable in some layer Si to a variable in Si−1 (see Fig. 11).
In particular, when dealing with structure-based causes and explanations in first-order reasoning about actions as
described in [9], binary causal models with a large number of variables are generated in a grounding step from first-
order theories in the ICL (such as the one given in Example 3.1), which have a natural layering through the time line,
and thus are a special kind of layered causal graphs.
We now first define layered causal graphs. We then prove that they are a special case of decomposable causal graphs,
and that recognizing them and computing their layers can be done in linear time. In the sequel, let M = (U,V,F ) be
a causal model, let X ⊆ V , let x ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U), and let φ be an event.
More formally, a layering of GV (M) relative to X and φ is an ordered partition (S0, . . . , Sk) of V that satisfies the
following conditions L1 and L2:
L1. For every arrow A→ B in GV (M), there exists some i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that A ∈ Si and B ∈ Si−1.
L2. Every A ∈ V occurring in φ belongs to S0, and Sk ⊇X.
We say that GV (M) is layered relative to X and φ iff it has a layering (S0, . . . , Sk) relative to X and φ. The width
of such a layering (S0, . . . , Sk) is the maximum of all |Si | such that i ∈ {0, . . . , k}. A layered causal graph GV (M)
relative to X and φ is width-bounded for an integer l  0 iff there exists a layering (S0, . . . , Sk) of GV (M) relative to
X and φ of a width of at most l.
Example 8.1. Fig. 12 provides a layering L = (S0, S1, S2) of the causal graph GV (M̂φX) in Fig. 6 relative to X′ =
X ∩ R̂ φX(M) and φ, where M = (U,V,F ) is a causal model and φ is an event such that the causal graph GV (M) and
the sets X and V (φ) are as in Fig. 2. The width of this layering L is given by 3.
The following result shows that layered causal graphs GV (M) relative to X and φ have a natural nontrivial decom-
position relative to X and φ.
Fig. 11. Path from X to φ in a layered causal graph.
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X
(M) and φ.
Proposition 8.1. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X ⊆ V , and let φ be an event. Let (S0, . . . , Sk) be a
layering of GV (M) relative to X and φ. Then, ((S0, S0), . . . , (Sk, Sk)) is a decomposition of GV (M) relative to X
and φ.
We next give a condition under which a layered causal graph GV (M) has a unique layering. Two variables A,B ∈
V are connected in GV (M) iff they are connected via a path in the undirected graph (V , {{A,B} |A→ B in GV (M)}).
A causal graph GV (M) is connected relative to X and φ iff (i) X = ∅, (ii) there exists a variable in X that is connected
to a variable in φ, and (iii) every variable in V \(X∪V (φ)) is connected to a variable in X∪V (φ). Notice that if X = x
is a weak cause of φ under u ∈ D(U), then (i) and (ii) hold. Furthermore, in (iii), each variable A ∈ V \ (X ∪ V (φ))
which is not connected to a variable in X ∪ V (φ) is irrelevant to “X = x is a weak cause of φ under u”.
The next result shows that when layered causal graphs GV (M) relative to X and φ are connected relative to X
and φ, then the layering is unique. For this result, observe that every event φ contains some variables A ∈ V , which
are all placed in the layer S0. By conditions (i) and (ii), also X contains some variables, which are all placed in some
layer Sk . By condition (iii), any other variable belongs to at most one layer Si , and thus to exactly one layer Si , since
GV (M) is layered.
Proposition 8.2. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X ⊆ V , and let φ be an event. If GV (M) is layered and
connected relative to X and φ, then GV (M) has a unique layering relative to X and φ.
We now provide an algorithm for deciding if a connected causal graph GV (M) relative to X and φ is layered
and, if so, for computing its unique layering: Algorithm LAYERING (see Fig. 13) computes the unique layering L=
(S0, . . . , Sk) of a connected causal graph GV (M) relative to X and φ, if it exists. The layering L is represented by
the mapping λ :V → {0, . . . , k}, defined by λ(A)= j for all A ∈ Sj and all j ∈ {0, . . . , k}. The following proposition
states the correctness of LAYERING.
Proposition 8.3. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model, let X ⊆ V , and let φ be an event, where GV (M) is connected
relative to X and φ. Then, LAYERING returns the unique layering of GV (M) relative to X and φ, if it exists, and Nil,
otherwise.
The next result shows that recognizing layered and width-bounded causal graphs GV (M) and computing their
unique layerings can be done in linear time. Note that deciding whether GV (M) is connected w.r.t. X and φ is also
possible in linear time.
Proposition 8.4. Given a causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , and an event φ, where GV (M) is connected w.r.t.
X and φ, deciding whether GV (M) is layered w.r.t. X and φ as well as width-bounded for some integer l  0, and
computing the unique layering of GV (M) w.r.t. X and φ can be done in O(‖GV (M)‖ + ‖φ‖) time.
By Proposition 8.1, all results of Sections 7.1–7.4 on causes, explanations, responsibility, and blame in decompos-
able causal graphs also apply to layered causal graphs as a special case. In particular, the relations Ri of Section 7.1
can be simplified to the following ones for layered causal graphs. The relation R0 is given by:
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Input: causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , and an event φ,
where GV (M)= (V ,E) is connected relative to X and φ.
Output: unique layering L= (S0, . . . , Sk) of GV (M) relative to X and φ,
if it exists; Nil, otherwise.
Notation: L is represented by the mapping λ :V → {0, . . . , k}, which is
defined by λ(A)= j for all A ∈ Sj and all j ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
1. for each A ∈ V \ V (φ) do λ(A) := ⊥ (i.e., undefined);
2. for each A ∈ V ∩ V (φ) do λ(A) := 0;
3. if X ∩ V (φ) = ∅ then for each A ∈X do λ(A) := 0;
4. while E = ∅ do begin
5. select some A→ B in E such that λ(A) = ⊥ or λ(B) = ⊥;
6. if B ∈X ∨ λ(A)= 0 then return Nil;
7. if λ(A) = ⊥ ∧ λ(B)= ⊥ then λ(B) := λ(A)− 1
8. else if λ(A)= ⊥∧ λ(B) = ⊥ then begin λ(A) := λ(B)+ 1;
9. if A ∈X then for each A′ ∈X \ {A} do λ(A′) := λ(A)
10. end
11. else /* λ(A),λ(b) = ⊥ */ if λ(A) = λ(B)+ 1 then return Nil;
12. E :=E \ {A→ B}
13. end;
14. if X ⊆ {A ∈ V | λ(A)= k}, where k = max{λ(A) |A ∈ V } then return λ
15. else return Nil.
Fig. 13. Algorithm LAYERING.
R0 = {(p,q,F ) | F ⊆ S0,p,q ⊆D(F),
∃w ∈D(S0 \ F) ∀p,q ∈D(F):
p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆ S0 \ F,w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ F \ Sk
}
.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the relation Ri is given by:
Ri = {(p,q,F ) | F ⊆ Si,p,q ⊆D(F),
∃w ∈D(Si \ F) ∃(p′,q ′,F ′) ∈Ri−1 ∀p,q ∈D(F):
p ∈ p iff F ′pw(u) ∈ p′,
q ∈ q iff F ′[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) ∈ q ′ for all W ′ ⊆ Si \ F,w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ F \ Sk
}
.
The following theorem is immediate by Theorem 7.1 and Proposition 8.1.
Theorem 8.5. Let M = (U,V,F ) be a causal model. Let X ⊆ V , let x ∈D(X) and u ∈D(U), and let φ be an event.
Let (S0, . . . , Sk) be a layering of GV (M) relative to X and φ, and let Rk be defined as above. Then, X = x is a weak
cause of φ under u in M iff (α) X(u) = x and φ(u) in M , and (β) some (p,q,X) ∈ Rk exists such that p = ∅ and
x ∈ q .
The next theorem shows that deciding whether X = x is a weak respectively actual cause of φ under u in
domain-bounded M is tractable, when GV (M) is layered and width-bounded. This is immediate by Theorem 7.2
and Proposition 8.1.
Theorem 8.6. Given a domain-bounded causal model M = (U,V,F ), X ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), u ∈D(U), and an event φ,
where GV (M) is layered (relative to X and φ) and width-bounded for a constant l  0, deciding whether X = x is a
weak (resp., an actual) cause of φ under u in M is possible in polynomial time.
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for width-bounded layered causal graphs.
9. Extended causal models
In this section, we show that with some slight technical adaptations, all the above techniques and results carry over
to a recent generalization of causal models to extended causal models due to Halpern and Pearl [17]. This shows that
the results are robust at their core.
An extended causal model M = (U,V,F,E) consists of a standard causal model (U,V,F ) as in Section 2.1 and a
set E ⊆D(V ) of allowable settings for V . For any Y ⊆ V , a value y ∈D(Y) is an allowable setting for Y iff y = v|Y
for some v ∈E. Informally, y can be extended to an allowable setting for V . In the sequel, we assume E is represented
in such a way that deciding whether a given y ∈D(Y), Y ⊆ V , is an allowable setting for Y is possible in polynomial
time.
The notion of weak cause in extended causal models M = (U,V,F,E) is then defined by slightly modifying the
conditions AC2(a) and AC2(b) in the definition of weak causality to restrict to allowable settings.
To extend the results in Section 5.1 to the notion of weak cause in extended causal models, we introduce a natural
closure property as follows. We say M = (U,V,F,E) is closed (resp., closed relative to X ⊆ V ) iff y ∪ (V \ Y)y(u)
is an allowable setting for V for all allowable settings y for Y , all Y ⊆ V (resp., all Y ⊆ V with X ⊆ Y ), and all
u ∈ D(U). Informally, if y is an allowable setting for Y , then extending y by the values of all other endogenous
variables in My under any u ∈ D(U) is an allowable setting for V . Notice that M is closed relative to all X ⊆ V , if
M is closed. The following result says that Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 carry over to the notion of weak cause in closed
extended causal models.
Theorem 9.1. Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 hold also for the notion of weak cause in extended causal models M =
(U,V,F,E) that are closed relative to X′.
For the results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we generalize the notions of a reduction and a strong reduction to extended
causal models as follows. The reduced (resp., strongly reduced) extended causal model of M = (U,V,F,E) w.r.t.
X = x and φ, denoted MφX=x (resp., M̂φX=x ), is defined as the extended causal model M ′ = (U,V ′, F ′,E′), where
(U,V ′,F ′) is the reduced (resp., strongly reduced) causal model of (U,V,F ) w.r.t. X = x and φ, and E′ = {v|V ′ |
v ∈E}. Notice here that, since E′ is the restriction of E to V ′, any procedure for deciding allowability relative to E is
immediately a procedure for deciding allowability relative to E′. The following result says that reductions and strong
reductions keep the closure property.
Theorem 9.2. Let M = (U,V,F,E) be an extended causal model. Let X ⊆ V and x ∈ D(X), let X′ = X ∩ R̂ φX(M),
and let φ be an event. Then: (a) if M is closed, then also MφX is closed; (b) if M is closed relative to X′, then also M̂φX
is closed relative to X′.
Using these notations, all the results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3 hold also for the notion of weak cause in closed
extended causal models. In particular, the following theorem generalizes Theorems 5.7 and 5.10.
Theorem 9.3. Let M = (U,V,F,E) be an extended causal model. Let X′ ⊆ X ⊆ V (resp., X′ = X ⊆ V ), let
x′ ∈ D(X′), x ∈ D(X), and u ∈ D(U), and let φ be an event. Let X′′ = X′ ∩ RφX(M) (resp., X′′ = X′ ∩ R̂ φX(M))
and x′′ = x′|X′′. Suppose that M is closed relative to X′′. Then, X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff
(i) (X′ \X′′)(u) = x′|(X′ \X′′) in M , and (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u in MφX (resp., M̂φX).
For the results of Sections 7.1 to 7.3, we generalize the notion of a decomposition of GV (M) and the relations Ri ,
i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, in Section 7.1 to extended causal models as follows. A decomposition of GV (M) relative to X = x (or
simply X) and φ is a tuple ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)), k  0, of pairs (T i, Si) such that D1–D6 in Section 7.1 and the
following condition D7 hold:
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Y 0 ∪ · · · ∪ Y k ⊆ V .
We then finally adapt the relations Ri , i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, in Section 7.1 by replacing “¬φpw(u)” and “F ′pw(u) ∈ p′” with
“¬φpw(u) and pw|(X ∪W) is allowable” and “F ′pw(u) ∈ p′ and pw|(X ∪W) is allowable”, respectively.
Using the above notations, all the results of Sections 7.1 to 7.3 (and thus all the results of Sections 6 and 8) hold also
for the notion of weak cause in closed extended causal models. In particular, the following theorem is a generalization
of Theorem 7.1 to the notion of weak cause in closed extended causal models. Note that the results of Section 7.4 can
be similarly generalized.
Theorem 9.4. Let M = (U,V,F,E) be an extended causal model. Let X ⊆ V , let x ∈ D(X) and u ∈ D(U), and let
φ be an event. Let ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)) be a decomposition of GV (M) relative to X and φ, and let Rk be defined
as above. Suppose that M is closed relative to X. Then, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (α) X(u) = x
and φ(u) in M , and (β) some (p,q,X) ∈Rk exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q .
10. Conclusion
Defining causality between events is an issue which beyond the philosophical literature has also been considered
in AI for a long time. Because of its key role for hypothesis and explanation forming, it is an important problem for
which a number of different approaches have been proposed. In the approach by Halpern and Pearl [15–17], causality
is modeled using structural equations, distinguishing between weak and actual causes of events which are modeled
by Boolean combinations of atomic value statements. Based on weak causes, a notion of causal explanation and
probabilistic variants thereof have been defined in [18], while a refinement of actual causality in terms of responsibility
and blame has been recently given in [3]. As has been argued and demonstrated, the structural-model approach by
Halpern and Pearl deals well with difficulties of other approaches, including recent ones in the literature (see [16–18]).
In order to bring the theoretical approach by Halpern and Pearl to practice, an understanding of the computational
properties and (efficient) algorithms are required. In this direction, the computational complexity of major decision
and computation problems for the approach has been studied in [3,6,7], and algorithms for computing causes proposed
in [21]. Since arbitrary Boolean functions are used to model structural equations, determining causes and explanations
is unsurprisingly intractable in general. Hence, the important issue of tractable cases arose, as well as how unnecessary
complexity in computations can be avoided.
Investigating these issues, we have first explored, extending work by Hopkins [21], how to focus the computation
of (potential) weak causes and causal models, by efficient removal of irrelevant variables. We have then presented a
new characterization of weak cause for a certain class of causal models in which the causal graph over the endoge-
nous variables is benignly decomposable. Two natural and important subclasses of it are causal trees and layered
causal graphs, which can be efficiently recognized, namely in linear time. By combining the removal of irrelevant
variables with this new characterization of weak cause, we have then obtained techniques for deciding and computing
causes and explanations in the structural-model approach, which show that these problems are tractable under suit-
able conditions. To our knowledge, these are the first explicit tractability results for causes and explanations in the
structural-model approach. Moreover, by slightly extending the new characterization of weak cause, we have obtained
similar techniques for computing the degrees of responsibility and blame, and thus also new tractability results for
structure-based responsibility and blame. Finally, we have shown that all the above techniques and results carry over
to recent refinements of the notion of weak cause and causal models due to Halpern and Pearl [17], and we have also
described an application of our results and techniques for dealing with structure-based causes and explanations in
first-order reasoning about actions in Poole’s ICL.
We have thus identified tractable special cases for decision and optimization problems of relatively high com-
plexity, which is to some extend remarkable. These tractability results are a nice computational property of causes,
explanations, responsibility, and blame in the structural-model approach.
An interesting topic of further studies is to explore whether there are other important classes of causal graphs
different from causal trees and layered causal graphs in which the tractable cases can be recognized efficiently
(that is, in which width-bounded decompositions can be recognized and computed efficiently). Another direc-
tion is analyzing how the techniques and results of this paper can be further developed for reasoning about ac-
570 T. Eiter, T. Lukasiewicz / Artificial Intelligence 170 (2006) 542–580tions [9] and commonsense causal reasoning [24]. Finally, implementation and further optimization remains for future
work.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (resp., 5.2). Let X0 ∈ X be such that (α) there is no directed path in G(M) from X0 to a
variable in φ (resp., (β) each directed path in G(M) from X0 to a variable in φ contains some Xi ∈ X \ {X0}). Let
X′′ = X \ {X0} and x′′ = x|X′′. It is now sufficient to show that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u iff (i) X0(u) =
x(X0) and (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u.
(⇒) Suppose that X = x is a weak cause of φ under u. That is, AC1 X(u) = x and φ(u), and AC2 some W ⊆
V \ X, x ∈ D(X), and w ∈ D(W) exist such that (a) ¬φxw(u) and (b) φxw′ zˆ(u) for all W ′ ⊆ W , Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪ W),
w′ = w|W ′, and zˆ = Zˆ(u). In particular, (i) X0(u) = x(X0), and also AC1 X′′(u) = x′′ and φ(u). By (α) (resp., (β)),
it then follows that AC2(a) ¬φx′′w(u) and (b) φx′′w′zˆ(u) hold for all W ′ ⊆ W , Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X′′ ∪ W), w′ = w|W ′, and
zˆ = Zˆ(u), where x′′ = x|X′′. This shows that (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u.
(⇐) Suppose that (i) X0(u)= x(X0) and (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u. That is, AC1 X′′(u)= x′′ and
φ(u), and AC2 some W ⊆ V \X′′, x′′ ∈D(X′′), and w ∈D(W) exist such that (a) ¬φx′′w(u), and (b) φx′′w′zˆ(u) for all
W ′ ⊆W , Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X′′ ∪W), w′ =w|W ′, and zˆ = Zˆ(u). By (i), it thus holds AC1 X(u)= x and φ(u). By (α) (resp.,
(β)), it follows that AC2(a) ¬φx′′x0w′(u) and (b) φx′′x0w′′zˆ(u) for all W ′′ ⊆W ′, Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W ′), w′′ =w′|W ′′, and
zˆ = Zˆ(u), where W ′ = W \ {X0}, w′ = w|W ′, x0 = (X0)x′′w(u), and x0 = x(X0). This shows that X = x is a weak
cause of φ under u. 
Proof of Proposition 5.3. (a) We first compute the set Aφ of all variables in φ and their ancestors in GV (M), and then
the set X′ =Aφ∩X. Using standard methods and data structures, the first step can be done in time O(‖φ‖+|E|) where
GV (M) = (V ,E), and the second step in time O(|V |). In summary, X′ is computable in time O(‖GV (M)‖ + ‖φ‖),
and hence in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖).
(b) We first compute the directed graph G′ obtained from GV (M) = (V ,E) by removing every arrow Xk → Xl
with Xl ∈X. We then compute the set A′φ of all ancestors in G′ of variables in φ. We finally compute X′ =A′φ ∩X.
Using standard methods and data structures, the first step can be done in time O(|V | + |E|), the second step in time
O(|V | + |E| + ‖φ‖), and the third step in time O(|V |). In summary, X′ is computable in time O(|V | + |E| + ‖φ‖),
hence in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖). 
Proof of Proposition 5.4. Recall that RφX(M) is the set of all variables A ∈ V from which there exists a directed path
in G(M) to a variable in φ. It thus follows immediately that X ∩RφX(M) is the set of all variables B ∈X from which
there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable in φ. 
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Let M ′ =MφX = (U,V ′,F ′). Let X′ =X ∩V ′ and x′ = x|X′. We have to show that X = x is
a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (i) (X \X′)(u) = x|(X \X′) in M , and (ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u
in MφX . The subsequent proof of this equivalence makes use of the following fact:
Fact A. V ′M(u)= V ′ φ (u) and φM(u)= φMφ (u).MX X
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AC2 some W ⊆ V \ X, x ∈ D(X), w ∈ D(W) exist such that (a) ¬φxw(u) in M and (b) φxw′ zˆ(u) in M for all
W ′ ⊆ W , Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪ W), w′ = w|W ′, and zˆ = Zˆ(u) in M . This shows that (i) (X \ X′)(u) = x|(X \ X′) in M .
We next show that also (ii) holds. By Fact A, AC1 X′(u) = x′ and φ(u) in MφX . Notice then that (a) ¬φx′w(u) in M
and (b) φx′w′zˆ′(u) in M , where x′ = x|X′, W =W ∩V ′, w =w|W , W ′ =W ′ ∩V ′, w′ =w′|W ′ =w|W ′, Zˆ′ = Zˆ∩V ′,
and zˆ′ = zˆ|Zˆ′. Since each among ¬φx′w(u), φx′w′ zˆ′(u), and Zˆ′(u) has the same values in M and MφX , this shows that
AC2(a) ¬φx′w(u) in MφX and (b) φx′w′zˆ′(u) in MφX for all Zˆ′ ⊆ V ′ \ (X′ ∪W), W ′ ⊆ W , w′ = w|W ′, and zˆ′ = Zˆ′(u)
in MφX . In summary, (ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in MφX .
(⇐) Suppose that (i) (X \X′)(u) = x|(X \X′) in M and (ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in MφX . Thus,
AC1 X′(u) = x′ and φ(u) in MφX , and AC2 some W ⊆ V ′ \X′, x′ ∈ D(X′), w ∈ D(W) exist such that (a) ¬φx′w(u)
in MφX and (b) φx′w′zˆ(u) in MφX for all W ′ ⊆ W , Zˆ ⊆ V ′ \ (X′ ∪ W), w′ = w|W ′, and zˆ = Zˆ(u) in MφX . By Fact A,
AC1 X(u)= x and φ(u) in M . Since each among ¬φx′w(u), φx′w′zˆ(u), and Zˆ(u) has the same values in M and MφX ,
this shows that (a) ¬φx′w(u) in M and (b) φx′w′ zˆ(u) in M for all W ′ ⊆ W , Zˆ ⊆ V ′ \ (X′ ∪ W), w′ = w|W ′, and
zˆ = Zˆ(u) in M . It then follows that AC2(a) ¬φxw(u) in M and (b) φxw′ zˆ(u) in M for all W ′ ⊆W , Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W),
w′ =w|W ′, and zˆ = Zˆ(u) in M , where x|X′ = x′ and x|(X \X′)= (X \X′)xw(u) in M . In summary, this shows that
X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M . 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Let F = {FA | A ∈ V }, MφX = (U,V ′,F ′), and MφX′ = (U,V ′′,F ′′). We first show that
V ′ = V ′′ and then that F ′ = F ′′, which proves that MφX coincides with MφX′ . The former follows from the fact that V ′
and V ′′ are both given by the set of all variables A ∈ V from which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable
in φ, while the latter follows from the former and the fact that F ′ = {FA |A ∈ V ′} and F ′′ = {FA |A ∈ V ′′}. 
Proof of Theorem 5.7. Let X′′ = X′ ∩ Rφ
X′(M). By Theorem 5.5, X
′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff
(i) (X′ \ X′′)(u) = x′|(X′ \ X′′) in M , and (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u in Mφ
X′ . By Proposition 5.6, it
holds that Rφ
X′(M) =RφX(M) and MφX′ =MφX , which proves the result. 
Proof of Proposition 5.8. We first show that the directed graph GV (MφX) is computable in linear time. Its set of
nodes V ′ = RφX(M) is the set of all variables A ∈ V from which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable
in φ, which is computable in time O(‖G(M)‖ + ‖φ‖) and thus in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖), using standard methods and
data structures. This already shows that GV (MφX) can be computed in time linear in the size of M and φ, since it is
the restriction of G(M) to V ′.
We next show that also MφX = (U,V ′,F ′) can be computed in linear time. Let F = {FA | A ∈ V }. As argued
above, V ′ can be computed in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖), but since F ′ = {FA | A ∈ V ′}, also MφX can be computed in time
O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖). 
Proof of Proposition 5.9. Recall that R̂ φX(M) is the set of all A ∈ V from which there exists a directed path in G(M)
to a variable in φ that contains no Xj ∈X \ {A}. It thus follows directly that X ∩ R̂ φX(M) is the set of all Xi ∈X from
which there exists a directed path in G(M) to a variable in φ that contains no Xj ∈X \ {Xi}. 
Proof of Theorem 5.10. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 5.5, using the strongly reduced causal model M̂φX
instead of the reduced causal model MφX . 
Proof of Proposition 5.11. We first show that the directed graph GV (M̂φX) is computable in linear time. Its set of
nodes V ′ = R̂ φX(M) is the set of all variables in φ and of all ancestors in G′ of variables in φ, where the directed graph
G′ is obtained from GV (M) by removing every arrow Xk → Xl with Xl ∈ X. Notice then that G′ is computable in
time O(‖GV (M)‖), and that V ′ is computable in time O(‖G′‖ + ‖φ‖), and thus in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖), once G′ is
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in the size of M and φ, since it is the restriction of G(M) to V ′.
We next show that M̂φX = (U,V ′,F ′) is computable in polynomial time. Let F = {FA | A ∈ V }. As argued above,
V ′ can be computed in time O(‖M‖ + ‖φ‖). Recall then that F ′ = {FA | A ∈ V ′ \ X} ∪ {FA | A ∈ V ′ ∩ X}. Since
all set operations are feasible in linear time using standard methods and data structures, it is sufficient to show that
a representation of every function FA, where A ∈ V ′ ∩ X, is computable in time O(‖M‖). Every FA(UA) is given
as follows. The set of arguments UA is the set of all ancestors B ∈ U of A in G(M). The function FA itself can be
represented by the restriction MA of M = (U,V,F ) to V and all ancestors B ∈ U of A in G(M). Then, FA(uA) for
uA ∈ D(UA) is given by A(uA) in MA. Observe that by Proposition 2.1, every FA(uA) is computable in polynomial
time. Clearly, UA and MA can be computed in linear time. Thus, the set of all functions FA, where A ∈ V ′ ∩X, can be
computed in time O(|V |‖M‖). In summary, this shows that M̂φX = (U,V ′,F ′) can be computed in time O(|V |‖M‖+‖φ‖). 
Appendix B. Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Using standard methods and data structures, deciding whether there exists exactly one
directed path in GV (M) = (V ,E) from every variable A ∈ V \ {Y } to Y can be done in O(|V | + |E|) time. Moreover,
deciding whether every A ∈ V \ {X} has a bounded number of parents can also be done in O(|V | + |E|) time. In
summary, deciding whether M is a causal tree with respect to X and Y is feasible in O(|V | + |E|) = O(‖M‖) time.
By Proposition 5.8, the directed graph GV (M̂YX) is computable in O(‖M‖) time from M and X,Y . Thus, deciding
whether M̂YX is a (bounded) causal tree is also possible in time O(‖M‖). 
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Clearly, (α) coincides with AC1. Assume that (α) holds. We now show that (β) is equivalent
to AC2:
AC2. Some set of variables W ⊆ V \X and some values x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) Yxw(u) = y,
(b) Y
xw′Zˆ(u)(u)= y for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W).
Clearly, we can assume that P i /∈W for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k−1}, since otherwise Yxw(u) = Yxw(u). This shows that W ⊆
W 1 ∪· · ·∪Wk . Observe then that we can enlarge every w ∈D(W) to some w ∈D(W), where W =W 1 ∪· · ·∪Wk ,
by defining w|W = w and w|(W \W) = (W \W)(u). Hence, we can assume that Zˆ ⊆ {P 0, . . . ,P k−1} and thus
also, by the path structure of the causal tree, that Zˆ = {P i} with i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Hence, it is sufficient to prove
that (β) is equivalent to the following condition AC2:
AC2. Some values x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W), where W =W 1 ∪ · · · ∪Wk , exist such that:
(a) Yxw(u) = y,
(b) Ypˆjw′(u)= y for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We now show that () for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that (p,q) ∈ Ri iff there exists some w ∈ D(W), where
W =W 1 ∪ · · · ∪Wi , such that for all p,q ∈D(P i):
(i) p ∈ p iff Ypw(u) = y,
(ii) q ∈ q iff Yqw′(u),Ypˆjw′(u) = y for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,min(i, k − 1)}.
This then shows that (β) is equivalent to AC2: (⇒) Suppose that some (p,q) ∈ Rk exists such that p = ∅
and x ∈ q . Then, some w ∈ D(W), where W = W 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Wk , and p ∈ p exist such that (a) Ypw(u) = y and
(b) Yxw′(u),Ypˆjw′(u) = y for all W ′ ⊆ W , w′ = w|W ′, and j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. That is, AC2 holds. (⇐) Suppose
that AC2(a) and (b) hold for some x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W), where W =W 1 ∪ · · · ∪Wk . Let p (resp., q) be the set
of all p ∈D(P k) (resp., q ∈D(P k)) such that Ypw(u) = y (resp., Yqw′(u),Ypˆjw′(u)= y for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′,
and j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}). Then, (p,q) ∈Rk , p = ∅, and x ∈ q . That is, (β) holds.
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Basis: Since R0 = {(D(Y ) \ {y}, {y})}, it holds that (p,q) ∈ R1 iff some w ∈ D(W 1) exists such that for all
p,q ∈D(P 1):
(i) p ∈ p iff P 0pw(u) ∈D(Y) \ {y} iff Ypw(u) = y,
(ii) q ∈ q iff P 0
qw′(u),P
0
pˆ1w′(u) ∈ {y} iff Yqw′(u),Ypˆjw′(u) = y, for all W ′ ⊆ W 1, w′ = w|W ′, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,
min(1, k − 1)}.
Induction: Recall that (p,q) ∈Ri iff some w ∈D(Wi) and (p′,q ′) ∈Ri−1 exist such that for all p,q ∈D(P i):
(i′) p ∈ p iff P i−1pw (u) ∈ p′,
(ii′) q ∈ q iff P i−1
qw′ (u),P
i−1
pˆjw′(u) ∈ q ′, for all W ′ ⊆Wi , w′ =w|W ′, j ∈ {1, . . . ,min(i, k − 1)}.
By the induction hypothesis, (p′,q ′) ∈Ri−1 iff some w′ ∈D(W ′), where W ′ =W 1 ∪ · · · ∪Wi−1, exists such that for
all p′, q ′ ∈D(P i−1):
(i′′) p′ ∈ p′ iff Yp′w′(u) = y,
(ii′′) q ′ ∈ q ′ iff Yq ′w′′(u),Ypˆjw′′(u)= y for all W ′′ ⊆W ′, w′′ =w′|W ′′, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,min(i − 1, k − 1)}.
Hence, (p,q) ∈ Ri iff some w ∈ D(Wi) and w′ ∈ D(W ′), where W ′ = W 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Wi−1, exist such that for all
p,q ∈D(P i):
(i) p ∈ p iff P i−1pw (u) ∈ p′ iff Ypww′(u) = y, by (i′) and (i′′),
(ii) q ∈ q iff P i−1
qw′ (u),P
i−1
pˆjw′(u) ∈ q ′ iff Yqw′w′′(u),Ypˆjw′w′′(u) = y, for all W ′ ⊆ Wi , w′ = w|W ′, W ′′ ⊆ W ′,
w′′ =w′|W ′′, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,min(i, k − 1)}, by (ii′) and (ii′′).
That is, (p,q) ∈Ri iff some w ∈D(W), where W =W 1 ∪ · · · ∪Wi , exists such that for all p,q ∈D(P i):
(i) p ∈ p iff Ypw(u) = y,
(ii) q ∈ q iff Yqw′(u),Ypˆjw′(u) = y for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,min(i, k − 1)}. 
Proof of Theorem 6.3. By Theorem 6.2, X = x is a weak cause of Y = y under u in M iff (α) X(u) = x and
Y(u) = y in M , and (β) some p ∈ Rk exists such that p = ∅ and x /∈ p. It is thus sufficient to show that deciding
whether (α) and (β) hold can be done in polynomial time. By Proposition 2.1, deciding whether (α) holds can be
done in polynomial time. Next, we observe that P 0, . . . ,P k and W 1, . . . ,Wk can be computed in time O(‖M‖). By
Proposition 2.1, every pˆi with i ∈ {1, . . . , k} can be computed in polynomial time. We then iteratively compute every
Ri with i ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Clearly, R0 can be computed in constant time, since V is domain-bounded. Observe then
that the cardinality of each D(Wi) is bounded by a constant, since V is domain-bounded and GV (M) is bounded.
Furthermore, the size of each Ri−1 and the cardinality of each D(P i) are both bounded by a constant, since V is
domain-bounded. By Proposition 2.1, P i−1pw (u), P i−1qw′ (u), and P
i−1
pˆjw′(u) can be computed in polynomial time. Hence,
every Ri can be computed by a constant number of polynomial computations, and thus in polynomial time. Hence,
Rk can be computed in polynomial time. Given Rk , deciding whether (β) holds can be done in constant time. In
summary, computing Rk and deciding whether (β) holds, and thus deciding whether (α) and (β) hold, can be done in
polynomial time.
By Theorem 2.3, since X is a singleton, X = x is an actual cause of Y = y under u in M iff X = x is a weak cause
of Y = y under u in M . So, deciding whether X = x is an actual cause of Y = y under u in M is also possible in
polynomial time. 
Proof of Theorem 6.4. By Theorem 5.10, X = x is a weak cause of Y = y under u in M iff X = x is a weak cause
of Y = y under u in M̂Y . By Proposition 5.11, M̂Y is computable in polynomial time. By Theorem 6.3, given M̂Y ,X X X
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deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of Y = y under u in M̂YX and thus in M is possible in polynomial time. 
Proof of Theorem 6.5. Recall that X = x is an explanation of Y = y relative to C iff EX1 Y(u) = y for every u ∈ C,
EX2 X = x is a weak cause of Y = y under every u ∈ C such that X(u) = x, EX3 X is minimal, and EX4 X(u) = x
and X(u′) = x for some u,u′ ∈ C. By Proposition 2.1, checking whether EX1 and EX4 hold can be done in polynomial
time. Clearly, EX3 always holds, since X is a singleton. By Theorem 6.4, deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of
Y = y under some u ∈ C in M such that X(u)= x can be done in polynomial time. Thus, by Proposition 2.1, deciding
whether EX2 holds can be done in polynomial time. In summary, deciding whether EX1–EX4 hold can be done in
polynomial time. 
Proof of Theorem 6.6. We first compute the set C of all u ∈ C such that either (i) X(u) = x in M , or (ii) X(u) = x
and X = x is a weak cause of Y = y under u in M . By Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 6.4, this can be done in
polynomial time. If X = x is a partial explanation of Y = y relative to (C,P ) in M , then CY=yX=x is defined, and
CY=yX=x = C by Proposition 2.4. Given CY=yX=x , the explanatory power P(CY=yX=x | X = x) is computable in polynomial
time by Proposition 2.1, if we assume as usual that P is computable in polynomial time. In summary, this shows (c).
To check partial (resp., α-partial) explanations in (a) (resp., (b)), we compute C as above. We then check whether
CY=yX=x is defined. That is, by Proposition 2.4, we check that X = x is an explanation of Y = y relative to C in M ,
which is possible in polynomial time by Theorem 6.5. Then, CY=yX=x = C by Proposition 2.4. We finally compute
P(CY=yX=x | X = x) as above and check that it is positive (resp., at least α), which can clearly be done in polynomial
time. In summary, this proves (a) (resp., (b)). 
Appendix C. Proofs for Section 7
Proof of Theorem 7.1. Obviously, (α) coincides with AC1. We now prove that (β) is equivalent to AC2:
AC2. Some W ⊆ V \X and some x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φxw(u),
(b) φxw′ zˆ(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W), and zˆ = Zˆ(u).
By D6, the variables in Sk have no parents in GV (M). Hence, every variable in Sk only depends on the variables in U ,
and thus we can move any A ∈ Sk \ (W ∪X) into W by setting w(A) = A(u). We can thus assume that X = Sk \W
holds. Since (i) W ⊆ V and X = Sk \W implies W ⊆ V \X, and (ii) X = Sk \W implies Sk ∪W =X∪W , it is thus
sufficient to show that (β) is equivalent to AC2:
AC2. Some W ⊆ V , x ∈D(X), and w ∈D(W) exist such that X = Sk \W and
(a) ¬φxw(u),
(b) φ
xw′Zˆ(u)(u) for all W
′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ V \ (Sk ∪W).
We now prove that () for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, (p,q,F ) ∈ Ri iff some W ⊆ T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i and w ∈ D(W) exist such
that F = Si \W and
(i) for every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1) p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i) \ (Sk ∪W).
In particular, this then implies that (p,q,F ) ∈ Rk iff some W ⊆ T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T k = V and w ∈ D(W) exist such that
F = Sk \W and
(i) for every p,q ∈D(F):
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(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T k) \ (Sk ∪W)= V \ (Sk ∪W).
This then shows that AC2 is equivalent to (β) some (p,q,X) ∈Rk exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q: (⇐) Suppose
first that (β) holds. Hence, some W ⊆ V and some w ∈D(W) exist such that X = Sk \W and (a) ¬φpw(u) for some
p ∈ p = ∅, and (b) φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for q = x ∈ q and all W ′ ⊆ W , w′ = w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ V \ (Sk ∪W). That is, AC2
holds. (⇒) Conversely, suppose now that AC2 holds. Let (p,q,X) be defined by (i), using W ⊆ V and w ∈ D(W)
from AC2 as W ⊆ V and w ∈D(W), respectively. Then, (p,q,X) ∈Rk , p = ∅, and x ∈ q . That is, (β) holds.
We give a proof of () by induction on i ∈ {0, . . . , k}:
Basis: Recall that (p,q,F ) ∈R0 iff some W ⊆ T 0 and w ∈D(W) exist such that F = S0 \W and
(i) for every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1) p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T 0 \ (Sk ∪W).
Induction: Recall that (p,q,F ) ∈ Ri iff some W ⊆ T i , w ∈ D(W), and (p′,q ′, F ′) ∈ Ri−1 exist such that F =
Si \W and
(i′) for every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1′) p ∈ p iff F ′pw(u) ∈ p′,
(i.2′) q ∈ q iff F ′[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) ∈ q ′ for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T i \ (Sk ∪W).
The induction hypothesis says that (p′,q ′,F ′) ∈Ri−1 iff some W ′ ⊆ T 0 ∪ · · · ∪T i−1 and w′ ∈D(W ′) exist such that
F ′ = Si−1 \W ′ and
(i′′) for every p′, q ′ ∈D(F ′):
(i.1′′) p′ ∈ p′ iff ¬φp′w′(u),
(i.2′′) q ′ ∈ q ′ iff φ[q ′〈Zˆ′(u)]w′′(u) for all W ′′ ⊆W ′, w′′ =w′|W ′′, and Zˆ′ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i−1) \ (Sk ∪W ′).
It thus follows that (p,q,F ) ∈ Ri iff some W ′ ⊆ T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i−1, W ⊆ T i , w′ ∈ D(W ′), and w ∈ D(W) exist such
that F = Si \W and
(i′′′) for F ′ = Si−1 \W ′ and every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1′′′) p ∈ p iff ¬φp′w′(u), where p′ = F ′pw(u), by (i.1′) and (i.1′′),
(i.2′′′) q ∈ q iff φ[q ′〈Zˆ′(u)]w′′(u), where q ′ = F ′[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u), for all W ′′ ⊆ W ′, w′′ = w′|W ′′, and Zˆ′ ⊆ (T 0 ∪
· · · ∪ T i−1) \ (Sk ∪W ′), and all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ T i \ (Sk ∪W), by (i.2′) and (i.2′′).
By D4–D6 in the definition of a decomposition, setting some of the T i -variables as W - or Zˆ-variables in (i.1′′′)
and (i.2′′′) does not influence the values of the variables in Si \ (W ∪ Zˆ). Thus, F ′pw(u) = F ′pww′(u), and
so ¬φp′w′(u) = ¬φpww′(u). Furthermore, it holds A[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) = A[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′Zˆ′(u)w′′(u) for all A ∈ F ′ \ Zˆ′, and
thus φ[q ′〈Zˆ′(u)]w′′(u), where q
′ = F ′[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u), is equivalent to φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′Zˆ′(u)w′′(u) = φ[q〈Zˆ(u)Zˆ′(u)]w′w′′(u). Hence,
it follows that (p,q,F ) ∈ Ri iff some W ′ ⊆ T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i−1, W ⊆ T i , w′ ∈ D(W ′), and w ∈ D(W) exist such that
F = Si \W and
(i) for every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1) p ∈ p iff ¬φpww′(u),
(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′w′′(u) for all W ′′ ⊆ W ′, w′′ = w′|W ′′, W ′ ⊆ W , w′ = w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i) \
(Sk ∪W ∪W ′).
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(i) for every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1) p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i) \ (Sk ∪W). 
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Observe first that X is bounded by a constant, since there exists a width-bounded decompo-
sition of GV (M) relative to X and φ. Hence, it is sufficient to prove the statement of the theorem for the notion of
weak cause. Let D = ((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)). By Theorem 7.1, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (α)
X(u) = x and φ(u) in M , and (β) some (p,q,X) ∈ Rk exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q , where Rk is computed
using the decomposition D of GV (M) relative to X and φ. By Proposition 2.2, deciding whether (α) holds can be
done in polynomial time. Since V is domain-bounded and D is width-bounded, it follows that R0 can be computed
in polynomial time, and that each Ri , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, can be computed in polynomial time from Ri−1. Hence, Rk can
be computed in polynomial time. Since V is domain-bounded and D is width-bounded, it then follows that, given Rk ,
checking (β) can be done in constant time. In summary, deciding whether (β) holds can also be done in polynomial
time. 
Proof of Theorem 7.3. We first prove the statement of the theorem for the notion of weak cause. Let X′′ = X′ ∩
R
φ
X(M) and x′′ = x′|X′′. By Theorem 5.7, X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (i) (X′ \X′′)(u)= x′|(X′ \X′′)
in M , and (ii) X′′ = x′′ is a weak cause of φ under u in MφX . By Proposition 5.8, RφX(M) can be computed in linear
time, and thus X′ \ X′′ = X′ \ RφX(M) can be computed in linear time. By Proposition 2.1, given X′ \ X′′, checking
(i) can be done in polynomial time. In summary, deciding whether (i) holds can be done in polynomial time. By
Proposition 5.8, MφX can be computed in polynomial time. By Theorem 7.2, given M
φ
X , checking (ii) can be done in
polynomial time. In summary, deciding whether (ii) holds can be done in polynomial time. Tractability also holds for
actual causes, since there exists a width-bounded decomposition of GV (MφX) relative to X′ ∩RφX(M) and φ, and thus
X′ ∩RφX(M) is bounded by a constant. 
Proof of Theorem 7.4. We first prove the statement of the theorem for the notion of weak cause. Let X′ =X∩R̂ φX(M)
and x′ = x|X′. By Theorem 5.10, X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M iff (i) (X \X′)(u) = x|(X \X′) in M , and
(ii) X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M̂φX . By Proposition 5.11, R̂ φX(M) can be computed in linear time, and
thus X \X′ =X \ R̂ φX(M) can be computed in linear time. By Proposition 2.1, given X \X′, checking (i) can be done
in polynomial time. In summary, deciding whether (i) holds can be done in polynomial time. By Proposition 5.11,
M̂
φ
X can be computed in polynomial time. By Theorem 7.2, given M̂
φ
X , checking (ii) can be done in polynomial time.
In summary, deciding whether (ii) holds can be done in polynomial time. Tractability also holds for actual causes,
since there exists a width-bounded decomposition of GV (M̂φX) relative to X∩ R̂ φX(M) and φ, and thus X∩ R̂ φX(M) is
bounded by a constant. 
Proof of Theorem 7.5. Since D (resp., DX) for (a) (resp., (b)) is width-bounded, it follows that |X| is bounded by
a constant. Hence, it is sufficient to prove the statement of the theorem for the notion of weak cause. Furthermore,
if X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M , then X′(u) = x′ in M . Hence, it is sufficient to show that for every
X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X), where x′ = X′(u) in M , deciding whether X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M can
be done in polynomial time. Observe then for (a) (resp., (b)) that D (resp., DX′ ) is also a decomposition of GV (MφX)
(resp., GV (M̂φX′)) relative to X′ ∩RφX(M) (resp., X′ ∩ R̂ φX′(M)) and φ. By Theorem 7.3 (resp., 7.4) for (a) (resp., (b)),
it thus follows that deciding whether X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M can be done in polynomial time.
In case (a), by exploiting the independence of RφX(M) from X, we can proceed as follows, avoiding multiple
computations of the set Rk . First, check that φ(u) holds and compute Rk for D and X′′ =X∩RφX(M). Then, for each
subset X′ ⊆ X′′ such that some triple (p,q,X′) exists in Rk such that p = ∅ and x′ ∈ q , where x′ = X′(u) in M , we
have that X′ = x′ is a weak cause of φ under u in M . Extending each such X′ by an arbitrary subset Z of variables
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weak causes X′ = x′ for φ under u in M where X′ ⊆X can be computed. 
Proof of Theorem 7.6. Recall that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C iff EX1 φ(u) for every u ∈ C, EX2
X = x is a weak cause of φ under every u ∈ C such that X(u)= x, EX3 X is minimal, that is, for every X′ ⊂X, some
u ∈ C exists such that (1) X′(u) = x|X′ and (2) X′ = x|X′ is not a weak cause of φ under u, and EX4 X(u) = x and
X(u′) = x for some u,u′ ∈ C. By Proposition 2.2, checking whether EX1 and EX4 hold can be done in polynomial
time. By Theorem 7.3 (resp., 7.4) for (a) (resp., (b)), deciding whether X = x is a weak cause of φ under some u ∈ C
such that X(u) = x can be done in polynomial time. Thus, by Proposition 2.1, deciding whether EX2 holds can be
done in polynomial time. We finally show that checking EX3 is possible in polynomial time. For (a) (resp., (b)),
observe that D (resp., DX′ ) is also a decomposition of GV (MφX) (resp., GV (M̂φX′)) relative to X′ ∩ RφX(M) (resp.,
X′ ∩ R̂ φ
X′(M)) and φ, for each X′ ⊂ X. Since D (resp., DX) for (a) (resp., (b)) is width-bounded, it follows that|X| is bounded by a constant. By Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 7.3 (resp., 7.4) for (a) (resp., (b)), deciding whether
(1) X′(u) = x|X′ and (2) X′ = x|X′ is not a weak cause of φ under some u ∈ C can be done in polynomial time, for
every X′ ⊂ X. Hence, deciding whether EX3 holds can be done in polynomial time. In summary, deciding whether
EX1 to EX4 hold can be done in polynomial time. 
Proof of Theorem 7.7. We first compute the set C of all u ∈ C such that either (i) X(u) = x in M , or (ii) X(u) = x
and X = x is a weak cause of φ under u in M . By Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 7.3 (resp., 7.4) for (a) (resp., (b)),
this can be done in polynomial time. If X = x is a partial explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) in M , then CφX=x is
defined, and CφX=x = C by Proposition 2.4. Given CφX=x , the explanatory power P(CφX=x | X = x) is computable in
polynomial time by Proposition 2.1, if P is computable in polynomial time, as usual. In summary, this shows (3).
To check partial (resp., α-partial) explanations in (1) (resp., (2)), we compute C as above. We then check that CφX=x
is defined. That is, by Proposition 2.4, we check that X = x is an explanation of φ relative to C in M , which is possible
in polynomial time by Theorem 7.6. Then, CφX=x = C by Proposition 2.4. We finally compute P(CφX=x | X = x) as
above and check that it is positive (resp., at least α), which can be done in polynomial time. In summary, this proves
(1) (resp., (2)). 
Proof of Theorem 7.8. Observe that the set of all X′ = x′ such that X′ ⊆X and x′ ∈D(X′) is bounded by a constant,
since V is domain-bounded, and D (resp., DX) for (a) (resp., (b)) is width-bounded, and thus |X| is bounded by
a constant. Hence, it is sufficient to show that for every X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X′), deciding whether X′ = x′ is an
explanation of φ relative to C in M is possible in polynomial time. This can be done in a similar way as the proof of
Theorem 7.6. 
Proof of Theorem 7.9. As argued in the proof of Theorem 7.8, the set of all X′ = x′ such that X′ ⊆X and x′ ∈D(X′)
is bounded by a constant. Hence, it is sufficient to show that for every X′ ⊆ X and x′ ∈ D(X′), deciding whether
X′ = x′ is a partial (resp., an α-partial) explanation of φ relative to (C,P ) in M is possible in polynomial time. This
can be done as in the proof of Theorem 7.7 (1) (resp., (2)). 
Proof of Theorem 7.10. We generalize the proof of Theorem 7.1. We show that some (p,q,X, l) ∈ Rk exists with
p = ∅ and x ∈ q iff AC2l holds:
AC2l. Some W ⊆ V \X and some x ∈D(X) and w ∈D(W) exist such that:
(a) ¬φxw(u),
(b) φ
xw′Zˆ(u)(u) for all W
′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ V \ (X ∪W),
(c) diff(w,W(u))= l.
As in the proof of Theorem 7.1, by moving any A ∈ Sk \ (W ∪ X) into W by setting w(A) = A(u) (which does not
influence diff(w,W(u))), it is sufficient to show that some (p,q,X, l) ∈ Rk exists with p = ∅ and x ∈ q iff AC2l
holds:
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(a) ¬φxw(u),
(b) φ
xw′Zˆ(u)(u) for all W
′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ V \ (Sk ∪W),
(c) diff(w,W(u))= l.
This can be done in a similar way as showing that (β) is equivalent to AC2 in the proof of Theorem 7.1, where
we use the following result () instead of (), which can be proved by induction on i ∈ {0, . . . , k} (in a similar way
as ()): () For all i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, it holds that (p,q,F, l) ∈Ri iff some W ⊆ T 0 ∪ · · ·∪T i and w ∈D(W) exist such
that F = Si \W , diff(w,W(u)) = l, and
(i) for every p,q ∈D(F):
(i.1) p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u),
(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all W ′ ⊆W , w′ =w|W ′, and Zˆ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪ T i) \ (Sk ∪W). 
Proof of Theorem 7.11. We first decide if () X = x is an actual cause of φ under u in M , which can be done in
polynomial time by Theorem 7.2. If () does not hold, then dr((M,u),X = x,φ) = 0. Otherwise, dr((M,u),X =
x,φ) = 1/(l + 1), where l is the minimal l for which some W ⊆ V \X, x ∈ D(X), and w ∈ D(W) exist such that
AC2(a) and (b) hold and diff(w,W(u)) = l. By Theorem 7.10, l is the minimal l for which some (p,q,X, l) ∈ Rk
exists such that p = ∅ and x ∈ q . Since V is domain-bounded and D is width-bounded, R0 can be computed in
polynomial time, and each Ri , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, can be computed in polynomial time from Ri−1. Thus, Rk can be
computed in polynomial time. Since V is domain-bounded andD is width-bounded, l can be computed in polynomial
time from Rk . In summary, l and thus dr((M,u),X = x,φ)= 1/(l + 1) can be computed in polynomial time. 
Proof of Theorem 7.12. By Theorem 7.11, every dr((M,u),X = x,φ), (M,u) ∈K, can be computed in polynomial
time. Assuming that P can be computed in polynomial time, also db(K,P ,X ← x,φ) can be computed in polynomial
time. 
Appendix D. Proofs for Section 8
Proof of Proposition 8.1. Let (S0, . . . , Sk) be an arbitrary layering of GV (M) w.r.t. X and φ. We now show that
((T 0, S0), . . . , (T k, Sk)), where T 0 = S0, . . . , T k = Sk , is a decomposition of GV (M) w.r.t. X and φ, that is, that
D1–D6 hold. Trivially, D1 and D2 hold. Moreover, L2 implies D3, and L1 implies D4–D6. 
Proof of Proposition 8.2. Assume that L= (S0, . . . , Sk) is an arbitrary layering of GV (M) relative to X and φ. By
L2, every A ∈ V (φ) ∩ V belongs to S0, and at least one such variable exists. By L2 and since GV (M) is connected
relative to X and φ, every variable A ∈ X belongs to Sk , and at least on such variable exists, where k is given via a
path P from a variable B ∈ V (φ) to a variable in X (in the undirected graph for GV (M)) as the number of arrows in
GV (M) that go against the direction of P minus the number of arrows in GV (M) that go in the same direction as P .
Indeed, if we move from B to A (against the direction of P ), any step backwards toward Si must be compensated
later with a step forward. By L1 and since GV (M) is connected relative to X and φ, for every i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, the
set Si is the set of all A ∈ V that are reachable from some B ∈ X ∪ V (φ) on a path P (in the undirected graph for
GV (M)) such that i is the number of arrows in GV (M) that go against the direction of P minus the number of arrows
in GV (M) that go in the same direction as P plus j with B ∈ Sj . That is, the layering L is unique. 
Proof of Proposition 8.3. In Step (1), we initialize λ(A) to undefined for all A ∈ V \V (φ). In Step (2), every variable
occurring in φ is put into S0, in order to satisfy one part of L2. In Steps (3)–(13), since GV (M) is connected, all the
other variables are put into some Sj such that L1 is satisfied. Step (3) takes care of the special case in which variables
from φ belong to X, where then only a trivial layered decomposition is possible. Steps (6) and (11) catch cases in
which no layering mapping as desired exists, and then Nil is returned. Notice that the for-loop in Step (9) is executed
at most once. Finally, we check in Steps (14) and (15) that X ⊆ Sk , where k is the maximal index j of some Sj , and
thus whether the other part of L2 is also satisfied. If so, then we return the computed layering λ; otherwise, we return
Nil. 
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Proposition 8.3, Algorithm LAYERING returns the unique layering L of GV (M) relative to X and φ, if it exists, and
Nil, otherwise. Observe then that Steps (1)–(3) of LAYERING take O(|V |+ |V (φ)|) time, Steps (4)–(13) take O(|E|+
|X|) time, and Step (14) is feasible in O(|V |) time (using an auxiliary variable for the maximum of λ, even in constant
time). Hence, LAYERING can be implemented to run in O(|V | + |V (φ)| + |E|) time, i.e., in O(‖GV (M)‖ + |V (φ)|)
time. Given that GV (M) is layered, deciding whether L is width-bounded by some integer l  0 can be done in time
in O(|V |). 
Appendix E. Proofs for Section 9
Proof of Theorem 9.1. The proof is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 5.1 (resp., 5.2), except that AC2 is
now replaced by AC2′′ (for the notion of weak cause in extended causal models). In the “⇒”-part, we use that x′′w
is allowable if xw is allowable, while in the “⇐”-part, we use that x′′x0w′ is allowable if x′′w is allowable, which
follows from the assumption that M is closed relative to X′′. 
Proof of Theorem 9.2. (a) Let V ′ = RφX(M) and M ′ = MφX . Assume M is closed. Let Y ⊆ V ′, let y be an allowable
setting for Y in M ′, and let u ∈ D(U). Then, y is an allowable setting for Y in M , and (V ′ \ Y)y(u) has the same
value in M and M ′. Since M is closed, y ∪ (V \ Y)y(u) is an allowable setting for Y in M , and thus y ∪ (V ′ \ Y)y(u)
is an allowable setting for Y in M ′. Hence, M ′ is closed.
(b) Let V ′ = R̂ φX(M) and M ′ = M̂φX . Suppose M is closed relative to X′. Let Y ⊆ V ′ with X′ ⊆ Y , let y be an
allowable setting for Y in M ′, and let u ∈D(U). Then, y is an allowable setting for Y in M , and (V ′ \ Y)y(u) has the
same value in M and M ′. Since M is closed relative to X′, it follows that y ∪ (V \Y)y(u) is an allowable setting for Y
in M , and thus y ∪ (V ′ \ Y)y(u) is an allowable setting for Y in M ′. This shows that M ′ is closed relative to X′. 
Proof of Theorem 9.3. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.5. We only replace AC2 by AC2′′ (for the
notion of weak cause in extended causal models). In the “⇒”-part, we then use that x′′w is allowable in MφX if x′w is
allowable in M , while in the “⇐”-part, we use that x′w is allowable in M if x′′w is allowable in MφX , which follows
from M being closed relative to X′′. 
Proof of Theorem 9.4. The proof is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 7.1, except that AC2 is now replaced
by AC2′′ (for the notion of weak cause in extended causal models), the relations Ri for the notion of weak cause
are replaced by the relations Ri for the notion of weak cause in extended causal models, and (′) is replaced by the
following statement (′′): for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, it holds that (p,q,F ) ∈Ri iff some W ⊆ T 0 ∪· · ·∪T i and w ∈D(W)
exist such that F = Si \W and (i) for every p,q ∈D(F): (i.1) p ∈ p iff ¬φpw(u) and pw|(X ∪W) is allowable, and
(i.2) q ∈ q iff φ[q〈Zˆ(u)]w′(u) for all Zˆ ⊆ (T 0 ∪ · · · ∪T i) \ (Sk ∪W), W ′ ⊆W , and w′ =w|W ′. Observe that in the step
from AC2′′ to (AC2 ′′), we then use the assumption that M is closed relative to X. Moreover, in the induction step,
we use the property D7 of decompositions in extended causal models. 
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